Aug 13, 2011

Strengthening institutes

By Ismail Khan


Pinnacled to the charts of a celebrity, Ms Hina Rabbani Khar was an instant hit with the Indian media. As if the Pakistani media had just got caught eye of her hidden glamour, it too flashed the glitz of the political icon. From the suave dresses she carried on to the pricey accessories she held, Ms Khar’s style kept the gossip circles activated.

Once back, she was critically evaluated for her job. ‘Ok, fine, she is a fresh face but does she have any fresh thought for a ‘change’ to the external rot?’ – is being asked.

While critique on her performance bursts out of the hype floated earlier, her job is nonetheless tough. As the commentary appearing in the media wants her to be, her challenge will come in balancing the expectation reflecting from her social symbolism against the position a state’s security line – good or bad – is long being treated.

First, the symbolism which glued the media to her very demeanour: at the young age of 34, Ms Khar is Pakistan’s only female and the world’s youngest foreign minister. Both, her gender and age, has the potential of gelling with those Pakistanis who come under the same bracket – that is the young and the women of the country.

It is not to say that her elevation was primarily factored to facilitate women or the young men to the top; certainly her feudal background matters much in Pakistan’s political landscape – a reality that has in any case earned her ticket to politics. However, to discard somebody’s performance or representation, as we often do in women’s cases by associating them as ‘male surrogates’, is unjust to the job they may potentially undertake. For, did Benazir Bhutto and present US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, not inspire women down the line, despite both of them enjoying access to the power corridors? It is in this spirit that Khar’s appointment should be appreciated, if not evaluated.

Similarly, in a country where the young population constitutes the majority of the population, Khar is certainly going to beam many a young face. Those who are making fun of her inexperience are only good at earning applause on TV shows – that’s it; it is advisable for them to engage constructively on the thematic front, if they are informed about it.

That said, many might ask if symbolism is the case, what’s the point of her appointment as foreign minister – why not appoint her as the youth minister? While the point is valid to an extent, a task for Khar is open up space in Pakistan’s diplomatic engagement that absorbs the potential of the women and youth of Pakistan. Notwithstanding the debate on the incongruity between domestic and international affairs, what is obvious is that the Khar-optimist wants her to bridge it. Many other are eager to point out the societal backlash of exercising some instruments of foreign policy. Whether or not the two can be compared is not the point.

For one, the youth bulge of Pakistan is repeatedly being referred to as ‘untapped resource’ which can go either way. Lack of opportunities for them is diverting a greater chunk of human resources away from pooling in the economic productivity of the state.

That is it. Now, consider this: immediately after assumption of charge, Ms Khar spoke of the fear of India hegemony. The Khar-optimists seemed to be surprised, but here was the reality check which they have already known.

For one, what constitutes change remains a debate in Pakistan. Realistically speaking, waiting on for any change is not an individual’s task. Arguably, therefore, it will be much better for her to revive the institutes responsible for framing foreign policy and enhancing the capacity of policy elites who have to take decision on foreign affairs.

Needless to say, where everything else fails, consensus works. It would not be wrong to argue that part of the success behind the Swat operation was the domestic consensus worked before the operation. For much part of our polity, there was polarisation within the society over whether and how to take action against the militants. Even the military is used to saying it cannot send its boys to an adventure, to be booed down by the society upon their return.

Thus, how much of the consensus gets formed in the future is the way to go. Specifically, one must mention the role of parliament’s subcommittees on foreign affairs whose performance, as documented recently by Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), is dismal. As their records show, “more than half of the members did not attend committee meetings with average attendance of members at 38%.”

The strength of the subcommittee is its diverse membership including top leadership of political forces. In a country where politicians have earned a stigma ‘manipulating’ violence, the engagements of such a committee will send strong signals down the line – that of ownership of the policies, which may or may not change. Without their involvement, everything is thrown in the garage of the ruling party or the military. Khar certainly can bring it on.

A critical look at the two nation theory


By Kashif Jahangiri

The kind of history that is taught right from the early school years in Pakistan has not helped us a great deal. By the time we grow up, with some of us getting into policymaking roles, we have developed a rigid approach which is India-centric. Be it foreign issues or economic matters, our focus is India rather than our own people, even if it comes at the cost of national prosperity. History should serve the purpose of being a guiding light. We should learn from the mistakes of the past in order not to repeat them. While history cannot be changed, the road to the future can certainly be.

One such tweaking of the history is the Two Nation Theory, which led to the incorrect belief that Pakistan was created as a religious state. The Quaid-e-Azam had not conceived Pakistan as a theocracy, and that is something he clarified on a number of occasions.

While reference is made to his presidential address to the historic Muslim League convention of March 1940 where he stated that Muslims and Hindus were ideologically different nations, the fact remains that it was in the context of Muslims being unfairly treated as a minority in British India. One should not forget that the slogans of Hindu nationalism were first raised by some Hindu extremists in the 1920s and 1930s. These included Lala Har Dayal, who in 1925 declared in his statement published in the Pratap of Lahore that the future of Hindus was based on four pillars namely: (a) Hindu Sangathan, (b) Hindu Raj, (c) Shuddhi of Muslims, and (d) conquest and Shuddhi of Afghanistan and the Frontier. These also included Vinayak Damodar Savarkar, whose 1925 book Hindu Pad-Padashahi bemoaned Muslim rule in India and called for an all-India Hindu empire under the hegemony of Maharashtra.

The sole objective behind the demand for Pakistan was to achieve the economic and social uplift of Muslims as much as possible. The objective was not to create a hate-filled divide between Muslims and Hindus. The demand was only for those areas where Muslims were in clear majority. Of course there were Muslims all across India, and not just in the areas covered under the demand for Pakistan. It was therefore implied that even after the creation of Pakistan there would still be Muslims living in India as a minority.

If the sole objective of the All-India Muslim League were to isolate Muslims from Hindus, then in June 1946 it would not have accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan of the British government which had proposed a confederation of United India comprising three provinces. The Muslim League was forced to withdraw its backing to the Plan when Pandit Nehru, on assuming the presidency of the Indian National Congress from Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, stated that Congress could make changes to the Plan after the British left. This assertion defeated the very objective of the acceptance of the Plan and the Muslim League was left with no option but to move on with its demand for Pakistan. It can therefore be said that Pandit Nehru partly contributed to the creation of Pakistan. Thus, the Two Nation Theory or the false notion of Muslims not being able to live with Hindus or the setting up of a Muslim theocracy had nothing to do with the creation of Pakistan.

Even if it is assumed that the Two Nation Theory was the basis for the creation of Pakistan (which is something going against the facts), should the State of Pakistan become a hostage to this concept in today’s world? The creation of Pakistan is now an established fact that cannot be just undone. We now need to move on.

We need to put this so-called theory to some logic test and see where it takes us to. The following questions spring to mind:

1. If Hindus and Muslims could not live together under any circumstances, why did it take Muslims a few centuries to realise this fact? Where was the Two Nation Theory when India was being ruled by Muslims?

2. If the Two Nation Theory was to be followed, why were there Muslims left in India to live under Hindu rule?

3. If the Two Nation Theory is still applicable, what is the status of Hindus living in Pakistan today? Why do we issue them National Identity Cards when they are not to be considered part of the same nation as Muslims? And why do they have representation in the Pakistani parliament?

4. Aside from the Two Nation Theory, are Muslims one nation themselves? If Muslims were one nation, why would the more wealthy Muslim states not grant nationality to less privileged Muslims from other countries, including Pakistan? On the contrary, why would Pakistan have a visa requirement for a Muslim from another country – including India?

5. If the Two Nation Theory was the binding force, why did East Pakistan secede to become Bangladesh?

Clearly, it takes more than religion to form a nation.

It would also be useful to see other examples of Two Nation Theories and related geographic divides in world history.

The idea of a Two Nation Theory was previously used by Thomas MacKnight in his book Ulster As It Is in 1896, where he tried to establish that the Protestants living in the North of Ireland were a nation distinct from the Catholics living on the rest of the island. The so-called Two Nation Theory was then pursued by many, including the writer W F Monypenny in his 1913 book The Two Irish Nations: An Essay on Home Rule. Interestingly, the Two Nation Theory was also supported by Arthur Clery, one of the Irish Republicans leaders. Mr Clery backed the theory to secure independence from British rule, perhaps feeling that independence from the British was not possible until the Protestants living in the North of Ireland were divorced from the Irish nation. Mr Clery’s test of Irishness was based on the Gaelic language and Catholic beliefs. The Irish Two Nation Theory matured over time and resulted in the creation of Northern Ireland under the Government of Ireland Act passed by the British Parliament in 1920. The Act then led to the formal division of Ireland in 1922 with 26 counties forming the independent Republic of Ireland and six counties of Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom. The division on the island of Ireland caused by the Two Nation Theory still carries its bitterness after 89 years of the divide. Even after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, violence still revisits this lovely island to haunt its inhabitants.

In his historic speech of Aug 11, 1947, the Quaid-e-Azam had stated: “In course of time, Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of the individual, but in the political sense as the citizens of one nation.” With this statement, the Quaid-e-Azam clarified that he did not see religion playing any role in the future politics of Pakistan. This statement of the Quaid-e-Azam should be enough to set aside the Two Nation Theory in the sense it is understood by many in Pakistan.

The contagion of fear


By Ishaq Khan Khakwani
Yuri Gagarin, at a reception in Indonesia for being the first man in space, took a dig at his Muslim hosts by saying that in his travels through space he did not see any God in the sky. A guest queried asked how he was looking for God in the sky. Gagarin responded that the capsule in which he was traveling had plexiglass windows through which he had a 360 degree view. The satisfied guest quipped: “If you had stepped out of your capsule, you would certainly have met Allah the Almighty, the Most Merciful.”

With all the arguments presented by the Awami League (AL) government leadership for negotiations on the CTG issue, the underlying one and only non-negotiable position is that it is not prepared to step down from office during elections. The rationale for this intransigence is exactly the same which prevented Yuri Gagarin from stepping out of his capsule to look for God.

The prime minister claims she is only implementing a Supreme Court decision and that parliament cannot violate it – a court that is on record of having made less than complimentary remarks about her own sanity. The vociferous Hindu parliamentarian, Mr Sen Gupta, invites the opposition to provide suggestions for an interim AL government during elections. Most AL functionaries are vocal in inviting the Opposition for talks on an interim AL government during the 90-day period of elections.

The invitation for negotiations must be appreciated. However, opponents of the government appear to treat this invitation as negotiations for the perpetuation of the AL regime. Fear is a highly contagious phenomenon. The AL government’s non-negotiable stance of not stepping down is a public confession – perceived by many as a declaration – that it is terrified of leaving office.

True, this government has invited the aversion of large segments of the population. This wrath has been incited by personalised vindictive persecutions and there may be concerns that the retributions for these may not be limited to civilised modes of censure. But it is dangerous for a government to publically acknowledge that it fears the spectre of being stripped of power.

The incumbent political administration in Bangladesh seems to have alienated a wide and diverse range of the population in the last two and a half years in office. In this impoverished country, a share scam skimmed off almost 12 billion dollars from the capital market – affecting around three million small investors – allegedly by the machinations of a “gang of eleven” led by a dervish who is publically and personally acknowledged as a commercial confidante of the AL supremo.

A monumental mishandling – critics suggest a deliberate ploy – of the BDR rebellion in 2009 has infuriated the officer cadre of the army and their families for failing to intervene in the massacre of army officers and the rape of their families over a period of three days. The indiscriminate killings of about 2000 BDR personnel and the kangaroo-court like convictions of over 8000 BDR non-coms and jawans has not endeared the AL government to these men and their families. The continuous harassment and intimidation of Muslim clerics and students of thousands of madressahs throughout the country by government intelligence agencies – on the plea of containing Islamic terrorists – has provoked serious resentment.

Indeed intelligence agencies have even taken to phoning imams of mosques in the middle of the night, ostensibly to know of their whereabouts – provocations that promoted a loathing that is potentially explosive.

The reservation of a 55 percent quota in government jobs for AL certified patriots, leaves only 45 percent to be recruited on merit – a policy that has created serious antagonism against the incumbent political administration in a community of nearly two million educated unemployed. Extra-judicial killings and abductions by Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) has become an international scandal – while the defence of RAB activities by the government has drawn the ire of all and sundry.

In a pathetic effort to delay the imminent threat of retaliation, the AL leadership has started beating the aging drum of its commitment to the ‘War on Terror’ – a hymn that is designed to resuscitate the enthusiasm of an international community disappointed by undisguised centralised and decentralised corruption. There has been an all pervasive erosion of confidence in the judiciary and rule of law due to extrajudicial killings and abductions, persecution of political opponents and human rights violations.

Fear has its own dynamics. When fear is publically displayed by a government’s marked reluctance to relinquish power to an independent caretaker government, it portrays the government’s petrification of possible enactment of animalistic vengeance for its excesses. The transparent apprehension of the government is likely to erode its authority over the civil and military administration that is less impressed with the fatalistic demeanour of any political leadership.

Fear and apprehension have been germinated at the highest level of government. Persecution invites retribution. Victimisation inspires vengeance. Violence begets violence. Extrajudicial killings invoke the possibilities of similar happenings. These are the elements that constitute the contagion of fear that is gaining momentum.

The deafening silence of the international community and the usually vocal civil society is adding to the ill forebodings of the immediate future. To avoid the impending catastrophe perhaps we should all make serious efforts to provide a safe exit for the incumbent from its fear of imminent doom and gloom.

It is in the interest of international stability and the security and promotion of 150 million Bangladeshis, that all those who wish for us to have the opportunity to formulate our destiny in peace and harmony, engage in efforts to channel retaliatory vengeance into a demonstration of civilised abhorrence of forces and actions through a free and fair election under an independent caretaker government sans preferences of external interests. Perhaps this is the singular option of possible deliverance from the contagion of fear that is fast expanding.