Shafqat Mahmood
The embarrassments for the security forces in the country continue. The latest being the killing of a youngster in Karachi by the Rangers. This comes on the heels of the Kharotabad killings in Quetta and allegations of ISI involvement in the murder of Syed Saleem Shahzad.
Grand conspiracy theories cannot explain these. The United States may indeed be warily eying our nuclear assets and making contingency plans to seize them. India may also have a hand in destabilising Balochistan. But can this account for the wanton cruelty and lack of discipline in the police and security forces?
Yes, discipline, because in the end it is a command and control failure. The six Rangers personnel in Karachi who participated in the killing of the alleged thief in cold blood had no fear of accountability. If there were any, they would not have stood by and watched or indeed encouraged one of their men to murder the poor kid.
And they may have gotten away with a manufactured story of an ‘encounter’ if it wasn’t for someone’s camera recording the gory episode. How many other such incidents have occurred that were never recorded and were successfully covered up by the superiors? It is this protection or misplaced sense of camaraderie that is the crux of the problem.
The Kharotabad incident is even more gruesome and suggests a greater deterioration of command. Painful is not the word to describe the wanton killing of the poor Chechen men, women and children. The active participation in this slaughter of the police chief and the Frontier Constabulary battalion commander reflects terribly on the quality of leadership in the security forces.
What has gone wrong with us as a nation? We are not a bad people and indeed have much that others can envy. We grow enough food to feed ourselves, have a reasonably educated middle class that can provide leadership in multiple fields, and our industrial base is not great but has a huge potential to grow.
We are also a beautiful country with a diverse landscape, from the tallest mountains in the world to fertile low lands and serenely picturesque deserts. And, we are not a new civilisation. Our history in this place we call home goes back thousands of years. Yet, with all these things going for us, we find ourselves in this frightful mess.
It is no use regurgitating in any great detail the awful mistakes we have made over the last 63 years. There is now a near consensus that our principal failures lie in not investing in the people, in not creating the circumstances for the rule of law to prevail, and in not creating the resource base to finance the state.
The return journey has to begin by correcting these mistakes. Our rapidly expanding population with a massive youth bulge of people under 25 is a liability because of illiteracy and a lack of skills. Our salvation lies in turning this liability into an asset by investing heavily in education and skill development.
It has been said umpteen times before, that a large cache of nuclear weapons could not save the Soviet Union from collapsing. Defining security narrowly as building up security forces and weapon systems is a sure recipe for failure.
The defence budget and debt servicing account for nearly 75 percent of our state expenditure. With this kind of resource allocation there is very little possibility of investing in the people. We have no choice but to put a cap on the money we are investing in weapon systems. If we have a hundred nuclear weapons, that should be at least 50 times enough. We don’t need another hundred.
The second massive failure has been not establishing the rule of law. In simple terms the concept means that law is supreme and the same for everyone – rich, poor, civil or military. The arrest of the IMF chief in New York for allegedly assaulting a maid should be a revelation for us. It is a story of one of the most powerful men in the world versus a poor black immigrant woman. We may love to hate America, but this is an example of law’s supremacy in that country.
To emerge as a civilised nation we have no choice but to follow the same track. This requires a societal change but it is not as impossible as it sounds. The motorway police have demonstrated it and now the Supreme Court in a number of cases is doing exactly the same. Its actions in the NICL case are an excellent example.
The son of a powerful politician is already behind bars. But, if it results in a sitting minister, somebody like Amin Fahim who took direct cash transfers into his and his family’s personal bank accounts, being arrested, it would send out a strong message of rule of law at work.
But, this notion of the law’s supremacy cannot only be confined to civilians. It must operate in the armed forces also. Then, it will put the entire nation on the right track. The military always claims that it has a robust mechanism of internal accountability. Let us see that in action. The Rangers personnel involved in this wanton killing in Karachi should be charged with murder, as should the police and FC personnel in Quetta. Let them get a fair trial, but there must be accountability.
It does not stop there. It has been many months since General Kayani ordered an inquiry into mismanagement and perhaps corruption in the NLC affair against a few Generals. This is also test case for the army and indeed for the entire notion of rule of law in the country. No one is suggesting a witch hunt but if there is guilt, the army’s internal mechanism of accountability must work.
It is only after the powerful civil and military institutions start demonstrating accountability that the principle of rule of law will take effect. If it does, it will provide the foundation for this country to start on the long road back to salvation. If it does not, nothing can stop us from going under.
The third essential element is creating the ability to finance the state or in simple terms having the ability to pay our bills. Much has been written on it and how it can be done, but unless the ruling class is ready, it will never happen.
The cabinet hooted down a proposal in the current budget to impose an asset tax. This was designed to make the rich pay more for the survival of the country, but the rich sitting in the government decided that they wouldn’t. Another example of the elite enjoying the best that this poor country has to offer but not wanting to share its burdens.
Rescuing the country from the dreadful state it is in right now is not complicated. What is required is visionary leadership. Where would this come from?
Jun 10, 2011
Balochistan and the ..................
Dr Qaisar Rashid
Balochistan is a story of broken promises. For example, in December 2009 Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani announced on the floor of parliament a 39-point package billed as “Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan.” Eighteen months later, what supposedly began as a process to give their long-denied rights to the people of Balochistan, and thereby initiate reconciliation in that restive province, turned out to have been a grandly announced false promise. Worse, there is little prospect that the pledges contained in the package will be fulfilled, at least not in the foreseeable future.
Under the package, all political prisoners should have been released, and the cases withdrawn against 89 Baloch political workers facing various charges. These actions were meant to create confidence in the Baloch that the central government intended to remove their grievances. A promise was made of a probe into the killings of Baloch leaders and politicians, including Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the head of the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), Balaach Marri, Ghulam Mohammad, Lala Munir and Munir Ahmed. For the probe to have credibility, it was to have been held by a retired judge of the Supreme Court.
Amid the general absence of transparency in Pakistan, no one can say for certain to what extent these promises have been honoured, if they were honoured at all. What is clear, however, is that the country’s largest province in territory remains alienated from the rest of Pakistan. Aside from the package, the Baloch had been given assurances that following the 2008 elections Pakistan would be a different country, one receptive to the complaints of grievances of all its ethnic groups. To this day, the reassurances continue to be rhetoric.
The package also made it mandatory on the federal government to table a report after every three months in parliament on the implementation of the provisions of the package. But is that happening?
The package contained a pledge for a review of the role of the intelligence agencies in Balochistan. No review has taken place, or at least it has not been made public by the government, and that is something to which the disaffected Baloch cannot be expected to take kindly. They are already angrier than ever at the state’s coercive tactics through the intelligence agencies, meant to terrorise the Baloch nationalists into submission. It doesn’t happen very often for a whole people to be browbeaten into submission; if anything, the Baloch will refuse to yield on what they consider a matter of honour.
It sometimes seems as if the conflict in Balochistan were all about a clash of egos, with the state machinery and the Baloch nationalists waiting to see who blinks first. Surely the state can afford be first in extending a hand of friendship to the nationalists, an act which would be in keeping with the pledges Mr Gilani made in December 2009.
In the Seventh National Finance Commission Award announced the same month, Balochistan was favoured with the incorporation of the criterion of inverse population density. Consequently, Balochistan secured about two percent over and above the financial share it would otherwise have been entitled to receive. That was made possible by the other three provinces and the centre relinquishing some of their own shares, to compensate Balochistan financially for the injustice done to it in the past. The award, with this financial impetus to Balochistan together with the greater autonomy to the provinces, was a positive step forward. But that was about all.
The political aspect of provincial autonomy was handed over to Balochistan through the 18th Amendment to the Constitution in 2010. In accordance with Article 161 of the Constitution, the net proceeds of the federal excise duty on natural gas or oil levied at the wellhead and collected by the federal government and of the royalty collected by the federal government is to be paid to the province in which the wellhead is situated. In this way, the ownership right on provincial natural resources, such as oil and gas, was devolved to the provinces.
Under Article 270AA (Clause 6 to 9), the Concurrent Legislative List will be dissolved fully by June 30, to complete the process of devolution of the matters mentioned in the list to the provinces. The question is why the Baloch are not satisfied with those financial and constitutional bids? Perhaps the reason is that the federation’s overall attitude towards them is not conciliatory. Political devices such as dialogues, offers and agreements should be applied immediately to Balochistan if the situation there is not to spiral out of control.
Meanwhile, Balochistan will continue to bleed. Until not long ago, one of the gravest problems in Balochistan related to missing persons. Now, it has taken a grisly turn, that of bullet-riddled bodies being discovered around the province. Who is making Baloch politicians “disappear” and who is now executing them is a big question staring in the face of the federation of Pakistan. Meanwhile, the death toll in inter-ethnic violence is rapidly rising as differences between Baloch and non-Baloch mount. The threat to the federation should sound alarm bells in Islamabad, but it apparently isn’t.
“Democracy is the best revenge,” as the slogan goes. Unfortunately, democracy isn’t considered the best solution to the problems in Balochistan. If it were, the province would not have been left at the mercy of the security forces. The pretext of “national security” gives no one the right to resort to violence in a troubled region of Pakistan, not even the security agencies.
Democracy has the potential to work wonders in the resolution of long-standing contentious issues. But democracy is in sharp contrast to authoritarian tactics employed in the name of democracy. Democracy does not mean overemphasis on the application of violent measures in the name of restoration of the writ of the state.
Unless the Balochistan package is implemented in its entirety, exercises such as the NFC Award and the 18th Amendment will be of no avail.
Balochistan is a story of broken promises. For example, in December 2009 Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani announced on the floor of parliament a 39-point package billed as “Aghaz-e-Haqooq-e-Balochistan.” Eighteen months later, what supposedly began as a process to give their long-denied rights to the people of Balochistan, and thereby initiate reconciliation in that restive province, turned out to have been a grandly announced false promise. Worse, there is little prospect that the pledges contained in the package will be fulfilled, at least not in the foreseeable future.
Under the package, all political prisoners should have been released, and the cases withdrawn against 89 Baloch political workers facing various charges. These actions were meant to create confidence in the Baloch that the central government intended to remove their grievances. A promise was made of a probe into the killings of Baloch leaders and politicians, including Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the head of the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), Balaach Marri, Ghulam Mohammad, Lala Munir and Munir Ahmed. For the probe to have credibility, it was to have been held by a retired judge of the Supreme Court.
Amid the general absence of transparency in Pakistan, no one can say for certain to what extent these promises have been honoured, if they were honoured at all. What is clear, however, is that the country’s largest province in territory remains alienated from the rest of Pakistan. Aside from the package, the Baloch had been given assurances that following the 2008 elections Pakistan would be a different country, one receptive to the complaints of grievances of all its ethnic groups. To this day, the reassurances continue to be rhetoric.
The package also made it mandatory on the federal government to table a report after every three months in parliament on the implementation of the provisions of the package. But is that happening?
The package contained a pledge for a review of the role of the intelligence agencies in Balochistan. No review has taken place, or at least it has not been made public by the government, and that is something to which the disaffected Baloch cannot be expected to take kindly. They are already angrier than ever at the state’s coercive tactics through the intelligence agencies, meant to terrorise the Baloch nationalists into submission. It doesn’t happen very often for a whole people to be browbeaten into submission; if anything, the Baloch will refuse to yield on what they consider a matter of honour.
It sometimes seems as if the conflict in Balochistan were all about a clash of egos, with the state machinery and the Baloch nationalists waiting to see who blinks first. Surely the state can afford be first in extending a hand of friendship to the nationalists, an act which would be in keeping with the pledges Mr Gilani made in December 2009.
In the Seventh National Finance Commission Award announced the same month, Balochistan was favoured with the incorporation of the criterion of inverse population density. Consequently, Balochistan secured about two percent over and above the financial share it would otherwise have been entitled to receive. That was made possible by the other three provinces and the centre relinquishing some of their own shares, to compensate Balochistan financially for the injustice done to it in the past. The award, with this financial impetus to Balochistan together with the greater autonomy to the provinces, was a positive step forward. But that was about all.
The political aspect of provincial autonomy was handed over to Balochistan through the 18th Amendment to the Constitution in 2010. In accordance with Article 161 of the Constitution, the net proceeds of the federal excise duty on natural gas or oil levied at the wellhead and collected by the federal government and of the royalty collected by the federal government is to be paid to the province in which the wellhead is situated. In this way, the ownership right on provincial natural resources, such as oil and gas, was devolved to the provinces.
Under Article 270AA (Clause 6 to 9), the Concurrent Legislative List will be dissolved fully by June 30, to complete the process of devolution of the matters mentioned in the list to the provinces. The question is why the Baloch are not satisfied with those financial and constitutional bids? Perhaps the reason is that the federation’s overall attitude towards them is not conciliatory. Political devices such as dialogues, offers and agreements should be applied immediately to Balochistan if the situation there is not to spiral out of control.
Meanwhile, Balochistan will continue to bleed. Until not long ago, one of the gravest problems in Balochistan related to missing persons. Now, it has taken a grisly turn, that of bullet-riddled bodies being discovered around the province. Who is making Baloch politicians “disappear” and who is now executing them is a big question staring in the face of the federation of Pakistan. Meanwhile, the death toll in inter-ethnic violence is rapidly rising as differences between Baloch and non-Baloch mount. The threat to the federation should sound alarm bells in Islamabad, but it apparently isn’t.
“Democracy is the best revenge,” as the slogan goes. Unfortunately, democracy isn’t considered the best solution to the problems in Balochistan. If it were, the province would not have been left at the mercy of the security forces. The pretext of “national security” gives no one the right to resort to violence in a troubled region of Pakistan, not even the security agencies.
Democracy has the potential to work wonders in the resolution of long-standing contentious issues. But democracy is in sharp contrast to authoritarian tactics employed in the name of democracy. Democracy does not mean overemphasis on the application of violent measures in the name of restoration of the writ of the state.
Unless the Balochistan package is implemented in its entirety, exercises such as the NFC Award and the 18th Amendment will be of no avail.
Before Karzai arrives
Zafar Hilaly
News that Hamid Karzai will soon be in Islamabad prompted a friend to say that it’s time for us to get our own act together and start exerting ourselves fully for the peace process, as it means so much for our future. He’s right: unless all players are onboard and throw in their weight with equal measure, the war will drag on without a closure in sight. We need an end to the war more desperately than others do, if only because our TTP problem has inexorably shifted the Afghan war to Pakistan. Alas, given the stated positions of the two main protagonists – the Afghan Taliban and the US – nothing of the sort is in the offing, not by a long shot.
Indeed, it will be a Herculean endeavour to get all the sides on to the peace table. The Afghan Taliban have said that their resistance will not end as long as US/IFAD forces remain in Afghanistan, whereas the Americans say they may never leave Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the prospect of substantial withdrawal of US forces next month under the phased plan seems doubtful.
So, just when it seemed that the killing of Osama bin Laden, the disbandment of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and American feelers for talks with the Taliban had created a propitious climate for peace talks, the two sides still remain poles apart.
Nevertheless, despite the posturing by both sides, the view that this war has no military solution is gaining ground. And, for the moment, let us discard as the usual bluster by Defence Secretary Gates perceptions that US forces are on the verge of securing a “decisive blow” against the Taliban. Who can forget that, decades earlier in Vietnam, another US defence secretary, Robert McNamara, had termed the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive as a “great victory” for the US, although it was one of those seminal events in that war that sealed the outcome against America.
True, the Taliban are under pressure as their traditional sources of revenue from abroad have come under greater scrutiny; and their profits from the drug trade are being squeezed by better controls. The increased fighting during the “surge,” and especially the night raids by Special Forces, has caused casualties among their experienced commanders, and even if these were quickly replaced, it must have had hurt their morale and fighting capability. Reports of Taliban foot soldiers taking advantage of US amnesty offers to hand in their weapons also suggest some success. But these are at best marginal gains. Since then, the Taliban have struck back and fighting has seldom been so intense or American casualties greater than in the month of May 2011. Moreover, Taliban recruitment has also not flagged. The truth is that the Taliban will never have a shortage of recruits in a war against foreign occupation.
At the same time, in the US, Congress is desperate to cut costs in deference to domestic priorities; the deeply afflicted economy shows little sign of recovery anytime in the near future and the presidential campaign is gearing up with record unemployment figures being a big headache for Obama. Furthermore, war weariness has grown on both sides of the political aisle; the recent success against Al-Qaeda in Af-Pak has reduced the urgency of relying overwhelmingly on combat operations in Afghanistan, and with the “surge” having failed to live up to its pre-launch hype hawks are more isolated than ever on current Afghan policy. In fact, Sen Lugar has questioned the entire purpose of an expensive war that in his view safeguards no important US interest.
Karzai too is moving harder on peace with the Afghan Taliban hierarchy in the hope of getting his message across. Of late, he has been remarkably uninhibited in his criticism of American military tactics, even issuing a “last warning” if the American military caused any more innocent civilian casualties. He has also managed to loosen the grip of the Northern Alliance by getting rid of two prominent Pakistan-haters in his inner coterie. He has skilfully placed himself at equidistant between the Taliban and their inveterate foes, the Tajiks, thereby making it possible for him to act as a conciliator between them, were that to become necessary during peace negotiations.
Pakistan too is finally getting its act together. The army is taking a manifest interest in the Afghan peace process. Kayani has met Karzai with the aim, no doubt, of removing the bad blood that was so evident between the army and the Kabul regime. And noticeably, whenever he journeys to Kabul, he takes the opportunity of calling on Karzai. It seems we have stopped pretending and woken up to the volcano that the Afghan war has potentially become and which we alone cannot douse by arming or playing off one proxy against another. The OBL and the Mehran fiascos have brought us down to earth by taking away the machismo and aura some within the establishment had built up of our own security apparatus and by laying bare for all to see what our fundamental problem is – it is our strategic extravagance.
Our perceptions of the Afghan Taliban are also changing, though perhaps not as perceptibly as some would like and the Americans have long hoped. The Afghan Taliban are no longer viewed as some kind of irresistible heroes who have a right to rule Afghanistan. Actuallym their nearness to the TTP in demeanour and spirit is a source of increasing concern and resentment. The thought that peace in Afghanistan may not lead to peace at home is slowly, ever so slowly, gaining an audience. Nevertheless, few here cavil that the Taliban remain the leading contenders for a share of power and must be accommodated constitutionally as a political force within a new post settlement security structure.
The fact is that civil conflicts, like in so many cases around the world, especially those burdened by with numerous players and cross-cutting interests and concerns, usually come to some conclusion at the end of a protracted and uneven peace process. So if the Afghan peace process, once it kick-starts, proves to be no different, this should not come as a surprise. The important thing for Pakistan is that it is vitally in its interest to see an end to this debilitating conflict. So much is at stake that it would be utter folly to underestimate its importance and urgency.
Civil conflicts as a rule share broad similarities; they have their own distinct contexts, and therefore there is no “one size fits all” solution. Solutions have to be adapted to the peculiar circumstances of the conflict itself. The process itself may eventually help to bring about flexibility and dynamism. It would be foolish to insist on preconditions or to come with fixed preconceptions. The hardest part is often getting the process started or getting the parties to organise themselves for the process.
The fact is that a zero sum gain (where one side’s gain is regarded by the other side as its loss) runs contrary to the concept of a peace process. While war can be a continuation of politics by other means, to quote Clauswitch, a peace process cannot be a continuation of war by other means. War has failed all sides. The only sensible alternative is reconciliation through a peace process.
It is time, therefore, that we got back to the normal business of diplomacy, demanding as it is, rather than persist with any game, great or not, if we are serious about pulling through our worst crisis. The complex Afghan peace process is going to be our biggest litmus test of that and Hamid Karzai’s visit to Islamabad this week is as good an opportunity as any to begin the process in earnest.
News that Hamid Karzai will soon be in Islamabad prompted a friend to say that it’s time for us to get our own act together and start exerting ourselves fully for the peace process, as it means so much for our future. He’s right: unless all players are onboard and throw in their weight with equal measure, the war will drag on without a closure in sight. We need an end to the war more desperately than others do, if only because our TTP problem has inexorably shifted the Afghan war to Pakistan. Alas, given the stated positions of the two main protagonists – the Afghan Taliban and the US – nothing of the sort is in the offing, not by a long shot.
Indeed, it will be a Herculean endeavour to get all the sides on to the peace table. The Afghan Taliban have said that their resistance will not end as long as US/IFAD forces remain in Afghanistan, whereas the Americans say they may never leave Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the prospect of substantial withdrawal of US forces next month under the phased plan seems doubtful.
So, just when it seemed that the killing of Osama bin Laden, the disbandment of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and American feelers for talks with the Taliban had created a propitious climate for peace talks, the two sides still remain poles apart.
Nevertheless, despite the posturing by both sides, the view that this war has no military solution is gaining ground. And, for the moment, let us discard as the usual bluster by Defence Secretary Gates perceptions that US forces are on the verge of securing a “decisive blow” against the Taliban. Who can forget that, decades earlier in Vietnam, another US defence secretary, Robert McNamara, had termed the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive as a “great victory” for the US, although it was one of those seminal events in that war that sealed the outcome against America.
True, the Taliban are under pressure as their traditional sources of revenue from abroad have come under greater scrutiny; and their profits from the drug trade are being squeezed by better controls. The increased fighting during the “surge,” and especially the night raids by Special Forces, has caused casualties among their experienced commanders, and even if these were quickly replaced, it must have had hurt their morale and fighting capability. Reports of Taliban foot soldiers taking advantage of US amnesty offers to hand in their weapons also suggest some success. But these are at best marginal gains. Since then, the Taliban have struck back and fighting has seldom been so intense or American casualties greater than in the month of May 2011. Moreover, Taliban recruitment has also not flagged. The truth is that the Taliban will never have a shortage of recruits in a war against foreign occupation.
At the same time, in the US, Congress is desperate to cut costs in deference to domestic priorities; the deeply afflicted economy shows little sign of recovery anytime in the near future and the presidential campaign is gearing up with record unemployment figures being a big headache for Obama. Furthermore, war weariness has grown on both sides of the political aisle; the recent success against Al-Qaeda in Af-Pak has reduced the urgency of relying overwhelmingly on combat operations in Afghanistan, and with the “surge” having failed to live up to its pre-launch hype hawks are more isolated than ever on current Afghan policy. In fact, Sen Lugar has questioned the entire purpose of an expensive war that in his view safeguards no important US interest.
Karzai too is moving harder on peace with the Afghan Taliban hierarchy in the hope of getting his message across. Of late, he has been remarkably uninhibited in his criticism of American military tactics, even issuing a “last warning” if the American military caused any more innocent civilian casualties. He has also managed to loosen the grip of the Northern Alliance by getting rid of two prominent Pakistan-haters in his inner coterie. He has skilfully placed himself at equidistant between the Taliban and their inveterate foes, the Tajiks, thereby making it possible for him to act as a conciliator between them, were that to become necessary during peace negotiations.
Pakistan too is finally getting its act together. The army is taking a manifest interest in the Afghan peace process. Kayani has met Karzai with the aim, no doubt, of removing the bad blood that was so evident between the army and the Kabul regime. And noticeably, whenever he journeys to Kabul, he takes the opportunity of calling on Karzai. It seems we have stopped pretending and woken up to the volcano that the Afghan war has potentially become and which we alone cannot douse by arming or playing off one proxy against another. The OBL and the Mehran fiascos have brought us down to earth by taking away the machismo and aura some within the establishment had built up of our own security apparatus and by laying bare for all to see what our fundamental problem is – it is our strategic extravagance.
Our perceptions of the Afghan Taliban are also changing, though perhaps not as perceptibly as some would like and the Americans have long hoped. The Afghan Taliban are no longer viewed as some kind of irresistible heroes who have a right to rule Afghanistan. Actuallym their nearness to the TTP in demeanour and spirit is a source of increasing concern and resentment. The thought that peace in Afghanistan may not lead to peace at home is slowly, ever so slowly, gaining an audience. Nevertheless, few here cavil that the Taliban remain the leading contenders for a share of power and must be accommodated constitutionally as a political force within a new post settlement security structure.
The fact is that civil conflicts, like in so many cases around the world, especially those burdened by with numerous players and cross-cutting interests and concerns, usually come to some conclusion at the end of a protracted and uneven peace process. So if the Afghan peace process, once it kick-starts, proves to be no different, this should not come as a surprise. The important thing for Pakistan is that it is vitally in its interest to see an end to this debilitating conflict. So much is at stake that it would be utter folly to underestimate its importance and urgency.
Civil conflicts as a rule share broad similarities; they have their own distinct contexts, and therefore there is no “one size fits all” solution. Solutions have to be adapted to the peculiar circumstances of the conflict itself. The process itself may eventually help to bring about flexibility and dynamism. It would be foolish to insist on preconditions or to come with fixed preconceptions. The hardest part is often getting the process started or getting the parties to organise themselves for the process.
The fact is that a zero sum gain (where one side’s gain is regarded by the other side as its loss) runs contrary to the concept of a peace process. While war can be a continuation of politics by other means, to quote Clauswitch, a peace process cannot be a continuation of war by other means. War has failed all sides. The only sensible alternative is reconciliation through a peace process.
It is time, therefore, that we got back to the normal business of diplomacy, demanding as it is, rather than persist with any game, great or not, if we are serious about pulling through our worst crisis. The complex Afghan peace process is going to be our biggest litmus test of that and Hamid Karzai’s visit to Islamabad this week is as good an opportunity as any to begin the process in earnest.
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