By Ziad Haider
US secretary of state Hillary Clinton’s three-day visit to Islamabad and Lahore highlighted the ongoing challenge of conducting diplomacy in Pakistan. The fact that Pakistan’s partnership is vital to US security, and yet 64 percent of Pakistanis view the United States as an enemy, represents no small challenge for the Americans. As the White House reassesses its “Af-Pak” strategy, it must clearly define US interests in Pakistan and chart a new course in the relationship that places a greater emphasis on diplomacy.
The US has two vital interests in Pakistan. The first is to combat extremism. This includes Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the associated domestic terrorist groups that threaten Pakistan’s stability.
The second is to ensure regional stability, for three reasons: to avoid a conflict between Pakistan and India, which would force Pakistan to redeploy troops from west to east, distracting it from the war in Afghanistan; to avoid an Indo-Pakistani conflict that may escalate up the nuclear chain; and to improve regional relations so that Pakistan no longer feels the need to retain militant proxies as leverage against its neighbours.
In combating extremism, the US has been relatively successful at securing Pakistani operational support in Afghanistan, including the transit of vital supplies; getting Pakistan to eliminate key Al Qaeda leaders; and nudging it to confront internal threats, such as those in the Swat Valley.
While domestic dynamics have driven many of these decisions, US diplomacy has played a role. These successes were accomplished through a mix of coercive and soft diplomacy, ranging from a “with us or against us” choice at the onset of the invasion of Afghanistan to the lifting of sanctions and generous provision of military assistance.
On regional stability, the US has successfully engaged in short-term crisis-management. These include external crises, such as the 2001-2002 Indo-Pakistani military mobilisation and the more recent standoff between the civilian government and opposition over the restoration of Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry. Breakthroughs were respectively possible due to high-level and intensive interventions by Secretary of State Colin Powell and by Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Yet, US diplomacy has also failed in significant measure. The US has been unable to alter the Pakistani army’s strategic calculus. The army continues to retain the Taliban and other militant groups as a hedging strategy against Pakistan’s neighbours and a seemingly inevitable US drawdown.
US diplomacy has also been unable to generate support among Pakistanis who harbour deep grievances: historic US support for military rule in Pakistan, “abandonment” and sanctions in the nineties, the invasion of Afghanistan, the drone strikes, and US policies in the Middle East. This tortured, and at times distorted, public narrative has impeded robust cooperation with Pakistan’s fragile democratic government.
Lastly, the US has failed to take a long-term view in addressing regional dynamics. Historic fissures remain, such as the border dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan and Indo-Pakistani grievances, including Kashmir. The military imperative of fighting a war in Afghanistan has eclipsed the diplomatic imperative of tackling the root causes of insecurity in the region.
So how does the US leverage diplomacy to strengthen its relationship with Pakistan based on “mutual interest and mutual respect?” Here are four key elements to consider.
First, US diplomacy must focus on the Pakistani people. The Kerry-Lugar Bill that tripled economic aid was an important start; patience and public diplomacy are required to reap the dividends.
Second, the US must also advance the resolution of core regional issues, including supporting the resumption of the Indo-Pakistani composite dialogue as well as an eventual Af-Pak dialogue on the status of the Durand Line.
Third, the US must manage the visibility/invisibility paradox. This entails maintaining a lower profile to avoid being overly intrusive. At the same time, the US must be sufficiently visible to secure the public dividend of development initiatives and to demonstrate sustained engagement. As reflected in the Kerry-Lugar debate, the US must also walk the fine legislative line between accountability for taxpayer money and perceived dictation infringing on Pakistani sovereignty.
Lastly, however, the US must be honest about why Pakistan matters. Stretching back through the Cold War, the US has always seen Pakistan through a security lens. This raises an inescapable question: can the relationship ever be sustainable if it pivots on avoiding negative outcomes instead of achieving positive ones? The way this question is answered or reframed will define the bilateral relationship beyond the current crisis of the hour.
For now, a democratic and prosperous Pakistan, at peace with itself and its neighbours, is critical for US national security. To this end, as in Afghanistan, the US is essentially fighting a form of counter-insurgency in Pakistan — minus the troops. This further necessitates a surge in US diplomacy toward Pakistan to secure a more willing and able partner.
Nov 22, 2009
A question of character
The mood at the late night meeting of PPP’s Central Executive Committee (CEC) held on November 16 is said to have been sombre. Some drew parallels with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s last days in power. The CEC was meeting in the aftermath of the biggest crisis the party has faced since the tragic assassination of its chairperson nearly two years ago. Now, the co-chairman, who succeeded her, faces the dire prospect of being ousted from presidency. That would mean not just his fall from power but also a re-opening of corruption cases. At the end of the legal process, there is the real possibility of conviction and loss of hard-won millions.
Faced with this grim outlook, members of the CEC can only offer solace to Zardari but hardly a way out of his troubles. Instead of carrying out some much-needed self-criticism, they spent considerable time in competitive sycophancy of the co-chairman and directed their anger at some familiar scapegoats. There was reportedly a lot of media-bashing, with Sardar Assef leading the charge and even suggesting curbs on press freedom. Fauzia Wahab, never to be outdone, has now spoken also of the machinations of the Jewish lobby.
But what Zardari needs more than proclamations of solidarity from his acolytes in the party is a way out of the imminent legal tangle that awaits NRO beneficiaries at the end of the month. Before the bill for the approval of this ordinance was withdrawn from parliament, Babar Awan had declared that if it was approved, the judiciary would have no power to declare it unconstitutional. Now that the government has itself withdrawn the NRO, he advised the CEC that the best way to defend its beneficiaries was to argue that decisions already given under the ordinance were final as “past and closed transactions.”
That is the line that the Zardari camp will probably be taking after November 28. But this position is hardly tenable because Article 264 of the constitution only protects actions taken under valid laws which stand repealed. It does not protect those under a law which was invalid at the time, either because the latter had already expired or is found to have been unconstitutional. This means that only acquittals made before February 4, 2008 can be treated as ‘past and closed transactions’, and even these can be invalidated if the Supreme Court holds that the NRO was unconstitutional. Zardari will not be able to claim the protection of Article 264 because his acquittals under NRO were all pronounced after this date.
The CEC members evidently knew this. Their unanimous view was that Zardari should avail himself of the constitutional immunity available to the president under Article 248. He, of course, did not need this advice because when he decided last year to seek the post of president rather than prime minister, it was precisely because the president enjoys this immunity while the prime minister does not. When those who drafted the 1973 Constitution wrote Article 248, it was certainly not their intention to make the presidency a safe haven for those trying to escape justice. They simply lifted the language of this article from the 1962 Constitution, which for its part had borrowed it from the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 giving immunity to the viceroy.
Whatever the interpretation of presidential immunity under Article 248 as it stands today, it is important to remove all ambiguity for the future. Ahsan Iqbal told a private TV channel on October 1 that PML-N had proposed a constitutional amendment for its abolition. However, Nawaz Sharif’s statement on November 17 that the president enjoys constitutional immunity for all criminal acts, it is doubtful whether PML-N still stands by its proposal.
Nawaz’s statement is not reconcilable with his earlier suggestion to Zardari that he should appear before the courts to clear himself of corruption charges. It is also out of tune with the predominant view within his party and with public opinion. Nawaz, therefore, owes the nation a clarification on this point. If PML-N is really serious about the proposal to do away with presidential immunity, it should give it at least the same priority as its demand for the abolition of a third-term ban for the prime minister.
Public opinion in the country certainly does not understand what justification there can be for exempting the president from the country’s penal laws. This is not simply a question of correct interpretation of a provision of the constitution. It is ultimately a question of the character and integrity of national leaders. Holders of high public office are expected to come up to an even higher standard of personal conduct than ordinary citizens. The nation is not prepared to entrust its destiny to someone who has been accused of abusing his position to pocket public money amounting to billions of rupees, and then refuses to face a trial which would give him an opportunity to prove his innocence. The demand for his ouster from office is not against a political party; it is directed at an individual.
The big question is how this can be done with least disruption to the political system. Several options have been mooted. Some of them involve judicial process while others depend on political and moral pressure. Those involving the judicial process turn on the qualifications for election as laid down in Article 62 of the constitution, in particular the graduation requirement which was introduced in 2002, but invalidated by the Dogar court in April 2008 to clear Zardari’s path to presidency. Since the Dogar court itself has now been held unconstitutional, its ruling could also be overturned by the Supreme Court on review. In that event, Zardari would stand disqualified and would have to vacate the presidency.
The option of removal by political process presents difficulties but these are not insuperable. The two-thirds majority required in both houses of parliament for impeachment is a very high bar. But if public pressure continues to build up, a formal vote may not be necessary.
The country is drifting from crisis to crisis but our political leaders are busy with their own petty games. As the Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu said, “If you do not change direction, you may end up where you are heading.” What is needed is a firm hand to change direction and steer the country to safety. Gilani is responsible for doing that. But so far he has shown neither the backbone, nor the broad shoulders, or the firm hand needed. Whether he likes it or not, he will have to grow them all very fast. He has only a few days to perform this anatomical wonder because the clock is ticking. In less than a week, cases against the NRO beneficiaries will stand revived but the government has yet to articulate a clear policy on what it will be doing about them. Gilani has to do it quickly. He has set a good example by declaring that he will resign if his wife is found to have benefited from NRO. To be credible, he should also immediately fire all those ministers and others in the government who sought to escape justice under the cover of NRO. He should ask them to stand trial and provide NAB with the financial and manpower resources needed for the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases.
Gilani should also order investigations into the Islamabad land deal scandal and the Agosta kickback affair in which Zardari has been implicated. An investigation is not a ‘criminal proceeding’ covered by the constitutional immunity of the president. If Zardari is really innocent, as he claims, then he has nothing to fear and should welcome the opportunity to clear his name.
Faced with this grim outlook, members of the CEC can only offer solace to Zardari but hardly a way out of his troubles. Instead of carrying out some much-needed self-criticism, they spent considerable time in competitive sycophancy of the co-chairman and directed their anger at some familiar scapegoats. There was reportedly a lot of media-bashing, with Sardar Assef leading the charge and even suggesting curbs on press freedom. Fauzia Wahab, never to be outdone, has now spoken also of the machinations of the Jewish lobby.
But what Zardari needs more than proclamations of solidarity from his acolytes in the party is a way out of the imminent legal tangle that awaits NRO beneficiaries at the end of the month. Before the bill for the approval of this ordinance was withdrawn from parliament, Babar Awan had declared that if it was approved, the judiciary would have no power to declare it unconstitutional. Now that the government has itself withdrawn the NRO, he advised the CEC that the best way to defend its beneficiaries was to argue that decisions already given under the ordinance were final as “past and closed transactions.”
That is the line that the Zardari camp will probably be taking after November 28. But this position is hardly tenable because Article 264 of the constitution only protects actions taken under valid laws which stand repealed. It does not protect those under a law which was invalid at the time, either because the latter had already expired or is found to have been unconstitutional. This means that only acquittals made before February 4, 2008 can be treated as ‘past and closed transactions’, and even these can be invalidated if the Supreme Court holds that the NRO was unconstitutional. Zardari will not be able to claim the protection of Article 264 because his acquittals under NRO were all pronounced after this date.
The CEC members evidently knew this. Their unanimous view was that Zardari should avail himself of the constitutional immunity available to the president under Article 248. He, of course, did not need this advice because when he decided last year to seek the post of president rather than prime minister, it was precisely because the president enjoys this immunity while the prime minister does not. When those who drafted the 1973 Constitution wrote Article 248, it was certainly not their intention to make the presidency a safe haven for those trying to escape justice. They simply lifted the language of this article from the 1962 Constitution, which for its part had borrowed it from the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 giving immunity to the viceroy.
Whatever the interpretation of presidential immunity under Article 248 as it stands today, it is important to remove all ambiguity for the future. Ahsan Iqbal told a private TV channel on October 1 that PML-N had proposed a constitutional amendment for its abolition. However, Nawaz Sharif’s statement on November 17 that the president enjoys constitutional immunity for all criminal acts, it is doubtful whether PML-N still stands by its proposal.
Nawaz’s statement is not reconcilable with his earlier suggestion to Zardari that he should appear before the courts to clear himself of corruption charges. It is also out of tune with the predominant view within his party and with public opinion. Nawaz, therefore, owes the nation a clarification on this point. If PML-N is really serious about the proposal to do away with presidential immunity, it should give it at least the same priority as its demand for the abolition of a third-term ban for the prime minister.
Public opinion in the country certainly does not understand what justification there can be for exempting the president from the country’s penal laws. This is not simply a question of correct interpretation of a provision of the constitution. It is ultimately a question of the character and integrity of national leaders. Holders of high public office are expected to come up to an even higher standard of personal conduct than ordinary citizens. The nation is not prepared to entrust its destiny to someone who has been accused of abusing his position to pocket public money amounting to billions of rupees, and then refuses to face a trial which would give him an opportunity to prove his innocence. The demand for his ouster from office is not against a political party; it is directed at an individual.
The big question is how this can be done with least disruption to the political system. Several options have been mooted. Some of them involve judicial process while others depend on political and moral pressure. Those involving the judicial process turn on the qualifications for election as laid down in Article 62 of the constitution, in particular the graduation requirement which was introduced in 2002, but invalidated by the Dogar court in April 2008 to clear Zardari’s path to presidency. Since the Dogar court itself has now been held unconstitutional, its ruling could also be overturned by the Supreme Court on review. In that event, Zardari would stand disqualified and would have to vacate the presidency.
The option of removal by political process presents difficulties but these are not insuperable. The two-thirds majority required in both houses of parliament for impeachment is a very high bar. But if public pressure continues to build up, a formal vote may not be necessary.
The country is drifting from crisis to crisis but our political leaders are busy with their own petty games. As the Chinese philosopher Lao Tzu said, “If you do not change direction, you may end up where you are heading.” What is needed is a firm hand to change direction and steer the country to safety. Gilani is responsible for doing that. But so far he has shown neither the backbone, nor the broad shoulders, or the firm hand needed. Whether he likes it or not, he will have to grow them all very fast. He has only a few days to perform this anatomical wonder because the clock is ticking. In less than a week, cases against the NRO beneficiaries will stand revived but the government has yet to articulate a clear policy on what it will be doing about them. Gilani has to do it quickly. He has set a good example by declaring that he will resign if his wife is found to have benefited from NRO. To be credible, he should also immediately fire all those ministers and others in the government who sought to escape justice under the cover of NRO. He should ask them to stand trial and provide NAB with the financial and manpower resources needed for the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases.
Gilani should also order investigations into the Islamabad land deal scandal and the Agosta kickback affair in which Zardari has been implicated. An investigation is not a ‘criminal proceeding’ covered by the constitutional immunity of the president. If Zardari is really innocent, as he claims, then he has nothing to fear and should welcome the opportunity to clear his name.
Obsolete policies on Afghanistan
By Saleem Safi
Disagreement on security issues is normal between any country’s political leadership and establishment. This is also the case with the United States. However, besides the establishment, the US media and think-tanks are so strong that the American leadership can’t deviate from the “line of action” dictated by all these powerful players. Powerful lobbies also add to the woes of the US political leadership.
The “self-made” president of the US, Barrack Obama, otherwise known for his massive achievements, is also confused over the future course of action in Afghanistan due to these multiple pressures and the same forces have also kept otherwise seasoned Hillary Clinton in shackles despite the fact that the Republicans are criticising the Obama administration for failing in devising a “new strategy” on Afghanistan.
If focused, two major causes for the failure of US forces in Afghanistan come to the fore — the domination of the US establishment over the political leadership vis-à-vis policymaking; and the role of the neighbouring states of Afghanistan — which are terrified due to the US designs of long stay in the region. These states are making the region a centre of a proxy war.
The manuscript emerging from the recent publications on the situation in Afghanistan reflects major differences between the State Department and the Pentagon in the recent past on policy matters. These also depict how people like Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney had overshadowed the decisions taken by Collin Powel in policymaking as Powel was calling for more focus on reconstruction and institution-building in Afghanistan. He also kept calling for taking on board all the countries neighbouring Afghanistan on the state of affairs in that country, while the Pentagon and the CIA, which had a mission to attain their strategic interests, invaded Iraq without achieving stability in Afghanistan.
Resultantly, the US people are facing the consequences of this “misadventure” carried out by the US establishment. After Obama’s election, there was hope that sanity would prevail and diplomatic channels would be preferred over reliance on army might to resolve the issues and the focus would be on diplomatic and political means. However, this hope is fast fading as the Obama administration is succumbing to the pressures of the establishment and the US administration is being pushed for sending additional troops to Afghanistan.
On the other hand, this war hysteria is likely to gear up as there is no hope for success in Afghanistan and more foreign troops would mean more dead bodies to be flown back to the US. The military and political leaderships of the US draws vivid divisions over sending troops to Afghanistan — a land fast turning into another Vietnam for the US.
The recent demand of more troops for Afghanistan has been made by Gen Stanley McChrystal and his stance has been backed by Mike Mullen, Hillary Clinton and Richard Holbrooke. Vice President Joe Biden, Defence Secretary Robert Gates and National Security Adviser James Jones are opposed to this demand for more troops and they are pushing Obama to look for other solutions to the predicament faced in Afghanistan.
The situation is so serious that eminent US journalist Seymour Hersh says that Obama is in a “warlike situation” with Pentagon over the issue. Those advocating sending of more troops overlook the reality that the US has been constantly beefing up the US troops’ presence in Afghanistan and even during the past year the force has been increased three times or more. Besides the announced strength of US troops in Afghanistan, there are reports of dispatching thousands of troops for Afghanistan covertly.
Recently, Ewen MacAskill, the Washington-based correspondent of The Guardian, reported that the Obama administration has sent 13,000 enablers to Afghanistan, which also included intelligence officials. Fareed Zakaria, an eminent journalist, has also written in Newsweek about the third increase in troops in Afghanistan saying, “Do we need a third surge?”
Besides the troops’ increase, the US has also multiplied the latest weapons’ supplies to Afghanistan, but to no avail. More US troops were killed in recent months in Afghanistan despite the troops and weapons’ increase and even the number of casualties surged to 55 in October, the highest one.
Another reason for the failure of US troops in Afghanistan has been their ignorance about the social, religious and cultural values of Afghan people. During my recent visit to Afghanistan, I was informed that US soldiers failed to obtain the sympathies of the locals as their acts were rather widening the already deepened gulf. In one such an incident, some of US soldiers invited the anger of the Afghan villagers when a US soldier was lying naked taking a sunbath after having showers in a pond in Kunnar province. He was soon spotted by Afghan village kids who got infuriated and threw stones at him. This resulted in firing at the kids by US troops and the situation turned into a bloody brawl.
The time is ripe for President Obama to exploit diplomatic and political channels for the resolution of the Afghanistan issue, rejecting the pressure put by the establishment for sending more troops to Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai should also lessen the burden of Obama, playing an important role in a fresh and meaningful dialogue with the Taliban leadership. A dialogue with the Taliban would be incomplete without taking Al Qaeda on board. Similarly, the Obama administration will also have to take all the neighbouring states of Afghanistan on board on dialogue process and their concerns will have to be addressed. This is the only solution to Afghanistan quandary — otherwise, the US will be trapped in the terrains of Afghanistan, the region will keep burning and Obama will face the same end as was the fate of George W Bush.
The same is the case for Pakistan as the country’s establishment has implemented its policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India for years. Now it is time for Pakistan to review its rotten strategy adopted and pushed by the establishment. There is dire need for the Pakistani establishment to take political leadership point of view in decision making as reliance on force is no solution to the predicament faced by the country.
Disagreement on security issues is normal between any country’s political leadership and establishment. This is also the case with the United States. However, besides the establishment, the US media and think-tanks are so strong that the American leadership can’t deviate from the “line of action” dictated by all these powerful players. Powerful lobbies also add to the woes of the US political leadership.
The “self-made” president of the US, Barrack Obama, otherwise known for his massive achievements, is also confused over the future course of action in Afghanistan due to these multiple pressures and the same forces have also kept otherwise seasoned Hillary Clinton in shackles despite the fact that the Republicans are criticising the Obama administration for failing in devising a “new strategy” on Afghanistan.
If focused, two major causes for the failure of US forces in Afghanistan come to the fore — the domination of the US establishment over the political leadership vis-à-vis policymaking; and the role of the neighbouring states of Afghanistan — which are terrified due to the US designs of long stay in the region. These states are making the region a centre of a proxy war.
The manuscript emerging from the recent publications on the situation in Afghanistan reflects major differences between the State Department and the Pentagon in the recent past on policy matters. These also depict how people like Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney had overshadowed the decisions taken by Collin Powel in policymaking as Powel was calling for more focus on reconstruction and institution-building in Afghanistan. He also kept calling for taking on board all the countries neighbouring Afghanistan on the state of affairs in that country, while the Pentagon and the CIA, which had a mission to attain their strategic interests, invaded Iraq without achieving stability in Afghanistan.
Resultantly, the US people are facing the consequences of this “misadventure” carried out by the US establishment. After Obama’s election, there was hope that sanity would prevail and diplomatic channels would be preferred over reliance on army might to resolve the issues and the focus would be on diplomatic and political means. However, this hope is fast fading as the Obama administration is succumbing to the pressures of the establishment and the US administration is being pushed for sending additional troops to Afghanistan.
On the other hand, this war hysteria is likely to gear up as there is no hope for success in Afghanistan and more foreign troops would mean more dead bodies to be flown back to the US. The military and political leaderships of the US draws vivid divisions over sending troops to Afghanistan — a land fast turning into another Vietnam for the US.
The recent demand of more troops for Afghanistan has been made by Gen Stanley McChrystal and his stance has been backed by Mike Mullen, Hillary Clinton and Richard Holbrooke. Vice President Joe Biden, Defence Secretary Robert Gates and National Security Adviser James Jones are opposed to this demand for more troops and they are pushing Obama to look for other solutions to the predicament faced in Afghanistan.
The situation is so serious that eminent US journalist Seymour Hersh says that Obama is in a “warlike situation” with Pentagon over the issue. Those advocating sending of more troops overlook the reality that the US has been constantly beefing up the US troops’ presence in Afghanistan and even during the past year the force has been increased three times or more. Besides the announced strength of US troops in Afghanistan, there are reports of dispatching thousands of troops for Afghanistan covertly.
Recently, Ewen MacAskill, the Washington-based correspondent of The Guardian, reported that the Obama administration has sent 13,000 enablers to Afghanistan, which also included intelligence officials. Fareed Zakaria, an eminent journalist, has also written in Newsweek about the third increase in troops in Afghanistan saying, “Do we need a third surge?”
Besides the troops’ increase, the US has also multiplied the latest weapons’ supplies to Afghanistan, but to no avail. More US troops were killed in recent months in Afghanistan despite the troops and weapons’ increase and even the number of casualties surged to 55 in October, the highest one.
Another reason for the failure of US troops in Afghanistan has been their ignorance about the social, religious and cultural values of Afghan people. During my recent visit to Afghanistan, I was informed that US soldiers failed to obtain the sympathies of the locals as their acts were rather widening the already deepened gulf. In one such an incident, some of US soldiers invited the anger of the Afghan villagers when a US soldier was lying naked taking a sunbath after having showers in a pond in Kunnar province. He was soon spotted by Afghan village kids who got infuriated and threw stones at him. This resulted in firing at the kids by US troops and the situation turned into a bloody brawl.
The time is ripe for President Obama to exploit diplomatic and political channels for the resolution of the Afghanistan issue, rejecting the pressure put by the establishment for sending more troops to Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai should also lessen the burden of Obama, playing an important role in a fresh and meaningful dialogue with the Taliban leadership. A dialogue with the Taliban would be incomplete without taking Al Qaeda on board. Similarly, the Obama administration will also have to take all the neighbouring states of Afghanistan on board on dialogue process and their concerns will have to be addressed. This is the only solution to Afghanistan quandary — otherwise, the US will be trapped in the terrains of Afghanistan, the region will keep burning and Obama will face the same end as was the fate of George W Bush.
The same is the case for Pakistan as the country’s establishment has implemented its policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India for years. Now it is time for Pakistan to review its rotten strategy adopted and pushed by the establishment. There is dire need for the Pakistani establishment to take political leadership point of view in decision making as reliance on force is no solution to the predicament faced by the country.
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