PCB after Ijaz Butt

Khalid Hussain Pakistan cricket had been crying out for change soon after Ijaz Butt took over as its chief in late 2008. Its prayers were finally heard last Tuesday when President Asif Zardari decided against giving Butt an extension and instead appointed Chaudhry Zaka Ashraf as the new chairman of the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB). Whether it’s the sort of change Pakistan’s cricket community was praying for is questionable. Only time will tell whether Ashraf, who had been serving as president of the Zarai Taraqqiati Bank Limited (ZTBL), manages to deliver at a time when Pakistan cricket is facing gigantic challenges on various fronts. Is Ashraf the right man to guide Pakistan cricket out of the current crisis? What we do know is that he has no cricketing credentials. It seems that Ashraf’s biggest asset is his close association with Zardari, who as PCB’s chief patron has the authority to hire or fire the board’s chairman. In that way, Ashraf reminds me of his namesake Nasim Ashraf, who preceded Ijaz Butt as PCB chief. Ashraf was handpicked by former president Pervez Musharraf only because of his close association with the general. But it’s unfair to rule anybody out without first giving him a try. Just hours after taking over as PCB chairman, Ashraf uttered all the right words. He talked about helping Pakistan regain its rightful place in international cricket. He promised to work for the return of international matches to our country. He talked about ending corruption and promoting unity within the team. He talked about promoting merit and developing a culture where winning matters more than anything else. Sounds promising? He does, but at the end of the day it’s just words. For Pakistan cricket, it will be Ashraf’s actions that will really matter. Once he takes over as PCB chief, Ashraf’s first few steps will be vital. For the best part of the last decade or so, PCB has resembled a ship sinking under its own weight. With an inflated staff, the board ends up spending more on its own operational costs than on the sport itself. Many of PCB’s senior officials are there thanks to their close association with Butt. Others are there because Butt won’t opt for competent people to replace them. Almost all of them are yes-men who wouldn’t dare raise their voices even as Butt made disastrous decisions during his three-year tenure. Many of them are almost as old as the 73-year-old Butt himself. It remains to be seen whether Ashraf persists with any of them, or lets them go. It also remains to be seen whether he too follows in Butt’s footsteps and appoints handpicked people, on his whims and fancies, to help him run Pakistan cricket. The fact of the matter is that Pakistan cricket cannot afford to suffer another Butt-like disaster. Ashraf should be well aware of the fact that Pakistan cricket is in neck-deep crisis. He comes at a time when a hearing related to last year’s spot-fixing trial in is full swing in a London court. The “evidence” being presented there against some of Pakistan’s leading cricketers, both from the past and present, is making headlines around the globe. That’s not all. International teams are refusing to visit Pakistan because of security concerns. We are hosting our matches on offshore venues, and that’s really costing us. If there ever was a time for a 180-degree change in Pakistan cricket, it is now. What PCB needs is a competent set of officials who are capable enough to make positive things happen. Ashraf should find people with the best available credentials and let them put the house in order. As an all-powerful chairman, he should exercise his authority only when it is really needed. There should be professionals to take care of the day-to-day business. The supporters of Ijaz Butt and his policies, though overwhelmingly outnumbered by his critics, used to argue that during his tenure Pakistan did reasonably well on the field. Pakistan won the 2009 ICC World Twenty20 title in England and reached the semi-finals of the 2009 Champions Trophy, the 2010 World Twenty20 and the 2011 World Cup. This is certainly a fact, but that doesn’t mean Butt’s policies, which used to be irrational more often than not, enabled Pakistan to do well in those events. The results were mostly achieved on the basis of the sheer individual brilliance of players like Younis Khan and Shahid Afridi. Younis and Afridi joined hands as captain and vice-captain to help Pakistan lift the Twenty20 crown. Just weeks after that memorable triumph, Younis was deserted by Butt at a time when he was facing a mini-revolt within his own team. Less than two years later, Afridi suffered from a similar fate when he was axed as captain just weeks after he almost single-handedly shepherded Pakistan into the semi-finals of the World Cup. Even if Butt had any direct contribution to those results, the positives during his era were few and far between. In any case, even a stopped clock is right twice a day.

The new brass on the block

Wajahat S Khan The game is on. Not the brash politicking from Raiwind that promises to dismantle the Presidency. Not the unscrupulous ingenuity from the Presidency that has muzzled the MQM back into the fold. Not from the Supreme Court as it tries to throw its weight around in Karachi. And not from Kabul, or New Delhi either, where Hamid Karzai and Manmohan Singh have matured a strategic pact in half the time of a human pregnancy. No, those are all little games. In Islamabad – correction, Rawalpindi – there is only one game in town. And it’s called the Promotion Game. Up for grabs are stars...preferably four, but three will work too. And if they’re made of brass, then the political alchemy for converting khaki cotton into the armour-plating of power becomes so much more easier. Here’s the backgrounder: General Ashfaq Kayani is set to retire (for a second time) in November 2013. That’s when his office will be available for occupancy. But till that moment arrives, like any bureaucracy – and the army is Pakistan’s biggest, even most politicised one – the ‘grooming’ and placement of his subordinates is key for the operational efficacy as well as internal dynamism of the institution he commands. Kayani’s latest move – the promotion of four major generals to the rank of lieutenant general – is a critical indicator of what lies next for Pakistan’s most powerful institution. Who’s going to be Spook-in-Chief (DG-ISI)? Or the guy who keeps all the brass connected (chief of General Staff)? Who’s going to be GHQ’s record-keeper (military secretary)? Or the man who will fight with (or talk to) the Taliban (commander XI Corps)? Which general shall keep the Americans out of Quetta while ensuring Baloch separatists are suppressed (commander XII Corps)? What about the chap who watches the nukes (commander Strategic Forces), or the one who keeps India busy across the LoC (commander X Corps) while keeping his ‘Coup Brigade’ (the ‘111’) oiled and ready? And let’s never, ever forget the next probable for the COAS title. So let’s war-game what Kayani is thinking. He’s got several immediate (operational/tactical) and a larger (strategic) responsibility pending for keeping his institution loyal and intact; keep fighting Pakistan’s multiple conflicts (which alphabetically and incompletely are: Afghanistan, Balochistan, CIA, drones, economy, Fata, floods, IAEA, India, Kashmir, Karachi) but keep the army reigning supreme. Ambitious as that goal may be, Kayani will need his house to be in order. Thus, with the latest batch of promotions, the COAS has been conservative and not broken precedent. He has overlooked all the 2-stars from the Corps of Engineers who were due for promotion, preferring to supersede them instead. This decision has worked out politically too, as the leader of the seniority list, Maj-Gen Junaid Rehmat, the DG-NLC, has been the subject of the recent flak attack by Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan’s Public Accounts Committee. Thus, Kayani has preferred to play it safe: Supporting Arms (like the Engineers, to which Rehmat belongs), are usually given less love at the highest levels, primarily to ensure the elitism of the Fighting Arms. It’s the way the Pak Army has always worked. So, Kayani has played by the rules. But the resumes of his choice all reflect the political complications of the intra-GHQ chess-match. Vice Chief of General Staff, Maj-Gen (now Lt-Gen.) Nasser Janjua, a former director military operations, was a wise choice. As the most senior fighting-arm representative (from the Punjab Regiment), he was hailed a tactical genius as GOC of the 17th Infantry Division, Kharian (the formation operated in Swat District from the crucial phase of November 2007 to December 2008). Janjua is a thinking soldier, and earned his spurs long before the success of his well-crafted Operation Rah-e-Haq. He’s got the seniority along with all the right postings and battle honours. Kayani promoting him was simply the ‘right thing’ to do, as it covers the meritocratic angle. However, Janjua has not been dispatched to a new posting yet. That means a coveted office will have to be emptied to accommodate him. Lt-Gen Asif Yasin Malik, who has been leading Peshawar’s XI Corps, might be shifted to GHQ as CGS, a position that incumbent Lt-Gen Waheed Arshad is expected to rotate out of soon, probably for a Corps posting that suits his Armour background. Janjua would be natural fit in Peshawar, and him getting Malik’s office will keep the Pentagon at bay as well, for he has been documented in Washington as a trailblazer in counterinsurgency operations. Alternatively, Janjua could get ‘groomed’ for a possible 4-star role, which would require him to be operationally familiar with both sides of the border. Thus, his trajectory could replicate that of Lt-Gen Tariq Khan, who’s been appreciated internationally as a war-hero for his work with the Frontier Corps and the 14th Infantry Division. Since his performance in Fata, Khan has been moved east and awarded the India-centric I Corps in Mangla, one of Pakistan’s two “strike” formations. Expect him to be rotated back into GHQ as a Principal Staff Officer for his own run for COAS, as him getting two Corps commands would be rare, even unprecedented. But regardless of the job-matrix, keep your radar on for Malik, Arshad, Khan and Janjua. They’re all among the finalists who could get 4-stars stitched to their shoulders. Gallantry, however, is not the only qualifier in this game. Barring those superseded, the newly promoted Lt-Gen Tariq Gilani has been quickly accommodated. Unlike the pending office for Janjua, Gilani’s immediate appointment is an example of Kayani’s ‘continuity’ doctrine. Also at display is the COAS’s ‘safe hands’ approach, for Gilani was stationed as the GOC of the 22nd Division in Sargodha, where he was also responsible for the 47th Artillery Brigade (an original among the few reputedly nuclear-capable formations). Thus, Gilani has been kept ‘within the system’ and placed in charge of the Army Strategic Forces Command: Yes, the nukes – at least some of the land-based delivery systems. In effect, this Gunner (he’s from the relevant Fighting Arm, Artillery) was already in the ‘asset management’ business for the army. His immediate appointment and its announcement is a signal to all: the bombs (some of them, for sure) are in safe, familiar, even academic hands. But remember that the ASFC is not regarded as a top-tier posting. Gilani will probably not press the red button when things go ballistic, though he will have some of the coordinates to shoot his birds at. Also, his political CV is, internationally, very acceptable, for he is a graduate of US Army War College (where he extensively researched Pak-American military ties) and served as commandant of the Armed Forces War College in Islamabad. But there is a personal angle to the appointment of Pakistan’s new nuke commander: he is a schoolmate, if not a school-chum, of Kayani himself (both are graduates of Military College Jhelum). However, in case someone shouts nepotism, the COAS can keep those charges down to a minimum, primarily because Gilani does have the credentials. Kayani’s next two choices have institutional patronage written all over them. Both are ‘young’ major-generals, (from the second batch of 2008) compared to the other two, but both promotions have incredibly different backgrounds. Artilleryman Lt-Gen Ijaz Chaudhry just served as DG-Rangers in Sindh, where he essentially delivered the message of the army to the civilians: without being granted adequate powers, his forces will just stay put. Just like he made his 14th Infantry Division settle back down in Okara after the hell that was Operation Zalzala, Chaudhry ably secured the operational aim of Karachi’s V Corps think-tank: keep mum, till they beg you to return. Temporarily sidelined by the chief justice of Pakistan for the Sarfaraz Shah killing scandal, Chaudhry waited in the bullpen till his comeback was easily spun as an ‘at your service’ move when things really went south in the city by the sea. Promoting him is a message in simple soduku from the army to all and sundry: that despite a political showdown with a major branch of government, you can still get 3 stars. Just follow your damn orders. Also interesting to note is that versus Janjua and Gilani, Chaudhry has made it so far because he carries the ‘Made-by-Kayani’ brand, as the decision for his promotion to 2-star rank was made in 2008, when the first selection board was chaired by a then newly appointment, chain-smoking COAS. To have come this far, despite the complications in Karachi, Chaudhry has probably cost Kayani a few cartons of well-filtered cigarettes. Interestingly, his promotion has not been simultaneously announced with a posting; that means Rawalpindi’s Biggest Gun is still thinking hard about placement. Expect to hear more about Chaudhry, the not-so-lone Ranger. But the appointment of Lt-Gen Naveed Zaman, currently Chief Instructor B-Division at the National Defence University, requires particular attention. Zaman’s brother-in-law, Brigadier Moeenuddin Ahmad, was killed by assailants in October 2009, who ambushed him along with his driver and guard in Islamabad, attacking their jeep with automatic weapons in broad daylight. A probable cause was that Maj-Gen Zaman was holding a key operational position in Waziristan then, for as GOC of the historic 7th Infantry Division, he was in the midst of launching the critical Operation Rah-e-Nijat that very same month. If that connection caused the killing, then Zaman’s service and plight didn’t go unnoticed. As an alumnus of Cadet College Hassan Abdal, he enjoys the company of a strong old-boys network in the recent and current GHQ and the JCSC Secretariat: Lt-Gen. Khalid Shameem Wynne (CJCSC), Lt-Gen Masood Aslam (former commander XI Corps), Lt-Gen Shujaat Zamir Dar (just retired POF chairman) and the man who till recently pushed all the files in the right direction, Lt-Gen Mohsin Kamal (MS and former commander X Corps); All those Abdalian connections, along with the COAS who had personally promoted him to 2-stars, helped ensure that Zaman be honoured with a safer but respectable ‘desk-job’ as commandant of the NDU. As he is a ‘consensus candidate’, representing the fraternity of the army, the announcement of Zaman’s immediate appointment as MS indicates that future selection boards, though chaired by Kayani, will make promotions that carry the distributed weight of the round-table of Pakistan’s khaki knights. So, sizing up Pakistan’s new brass on the block, the COAS’s office politics show that he is increasingly going to make future decisions in a way outgoing generals tend to – or are forced to: as first, among equals. The writer is a former Shorenstein Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and a broadcast/online journalist. Email: wajahat _khan@hks.harvard.edu

Mastung carnage

Harris Khalique After the Mastung carnage the other day when people were dismounted from the bus, lined up and shot, followed by attacks on the attendants of the injured and mourners of the deceased in Quetta, I am really worried about the safety and security of Quaid-e-Azam’s mausoleum and Allama Iqbal’s tomb. Twenty-nine Shia Muslims belonging to the Hazara community of Balochistan lost their lives. Many are wounded. This was not the first time. Shia Muslims in the length and breadth of Pakistan, from Gilgit to Karachi, are being targeted in general. But those belonging to the Hazara community have taken the brunt in the last few years. They are continuously threatened, attacked and killed. Some say that the cause of this violence against the Dari-speaking Hazaras is rooted in the conflict between the Taliban and the protégé of the erstwhile northern alliance in today’s Afghanistan. Others blame it on the proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran being waged in our country for years unending. Some also say it is the Jundullah, the separatists from Iranian Balochistan who have adopted a certain religious hue. Then the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, ingrained in the interior of Punjab but now spread all over, takes the blame. Without a doubt no one is spared in the killing fields of Pakistan. Sunni Muslims of different denominations are killed in their mosques, Christian churches and neighbourhoods are torched, Hindus are hounded out of Muslim areas if their children drink water from the same tap, Ahmadis are killed while saying their prayers, Pakhtuns, Baloch, Sindhis, Punjabis, Mohajirs, Seraikis, Hazarawals of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, all fight each other under the banner of different political outfits. School buses are attacked, houses and hotels are blown up, offices are ransacked, markets are bombed. However, Shias are being identified and killed indiscriminately for many years by no one else but their own countrymen. Be they doctors in Karachi, worshippers in Quetta, processionists in Hangu, passengers in Talagang, bystanders in Gilgit-Baltistan, they are all targeted. There is a newly found passion among a certain segment of Pakistanis for correcting the path our ancestors treaded and purifying our customs and rituals of any adulteration brought about by the spreading of Islam in the non-Arab world. That path is no other than the Saudi path. But something that always intrigues me is that it took the Arabs 1300 years to raze the graveyard of the family and companions of the Prophet (PBUH) in Medina to cleanse the faith from impurities. I would just want to come back to where I started. Why is the Quaid-e-Azam’s mausoleum in danger? Because Mohammed Ali Jinnah was born into a predominantly Ismaili family, got married the Shia Isna Ashri way and offered his prayers with Sunni Muslims. And something that I have shared once before about Shorish Kashmiri asking him if he was a Shia or a Sunni, to which he responded, “Was our Prophet Shia or Sunni?” Likewise, Iqbal says about himself in his poem Zuhd Aur Rindi (Piety and Profanity), “Suntey hain keh uss mein haiy tashayyo bhi zara sa... Tafzeel-i-Ali hum ney suni uss ki zabani (People say that there is a Shia tinge in his beliefs... He speaks of the primacy of Hazrat Ali). Iqbal’s son Justice (retired) Javed Iqbal quoted his father once, “I belong to the Ahl-i-Sunnat-Wal-Jama’at (Sunni sect) but in my view those who do not love and revere the Ahl-i-Bait (the members of the house of the Prophet) cannot be true Muslims.” So what do you think readers, are the resting places of the Quaid and Iqbal safe?