By Ikram Sehgal
Induction of 30,000 more US troops into the Afghanistan theatre in the coming weeks and months, with 5,000 more committed by NATO countries (and possibly 5,000 more to come) represents the “military surge,” first of the three initiatives outlined by US President Obama in his new Afghan strategy.
Four fundamental pillars shore up Gen Stanley McChrystal’s new Afghan thinking: (1) more effective and larger Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) with radically expanded coalition force partnering them at every echelon; (2) prioritising a responsive and accountable governance acceptable to the Afghan people, to be on par with, and integral to, the delivering of security; (3) gaining the initiative and reverse the insurgency’s momentum as the first imperative in a series of temporal stages, and; (4) prioritising available resources to those critical areas where the population is most threatened.
In the face of the “Obama Doctrine,” a few facts need elaboration: (1) the Taliban support for AlQaeda is a common cause against a common enemy: (2) from the South Waziristan Agency the Taliban are not engaged in cross-border operations into Afghanistan, Mehsud mercenaries providing a protective cordon for the AlQaeda hierarchy; (3) the Indian RAW virtually took over the mainstream Afghan intelligence agencies after 2001, instigating the so-called “Taliban” in South Waziristan to open up a western front for Pakistan, and ease the internal pressure in occupied Kashmir by actively supporting the Baloch insurgency, and the TTP in Swat. The 64,000-dollar question, given the substantial evidence about Indian machinations against Pakistan, is: why is the US silent?; and (4) Pakistan’s catch-22, Indian propaganda has managed to convert a genuine freedom struggle in occupied Kashmir into a “terrorist increment,” an enduring perception exists internationally of our intelligence agencies actively aiding the Taliban in Afghanistan, at the very least having a benign attitude towards the jihadists.
McChrystal’s reports mentions Taliban weaknesses: “(1) The activity of criminal networks creating a pool of manpower, resources, and capabilities for insurgents contributes to a pervasive sense of insecurity among the people. A number of Afghan government officials at all levels are reportedly complicit in these activities. (2) Narcotics activity funding insurgent groups must be understood within the overall context of insurgent financing, substantial income coming from foreign donors as well as from other criminal activities within Afghanistan such as smuggling and kidnapping for ransom. Some insurgent groups ‘tax’ the local population through checkpoints and protection money. (3) The insurgents are not invulnerable, they have exploitable shortcomings, their command-and-control frictions and divergent goals hamper insurgent planning and restrict coordination of operations and their excesses alienate the people. Having previously held power in Afghanistan and failed, popular enthusiasm for them appears limited as does their ability to spread viably beyond Pakhtun areas. There is an opportunity to exploit the insurgent’s inability to mobilize public support.”
The major thrust of the new US “Afghan strategy” is to build the capacity of Afghans to take responsibility for their own security. While McChrystal maintains the Afghan National Army is increasingly capable of leading or conducting independent operations, the ANA remains very much dependant on international forces, and rather unwilling to fight. Late last year a decision was taken to increase the ANA’s size from 92,000 to 134,000, the Afghan ministry of defence plans to accelerate training to enhance security in key areas, mainly in southern Afghanistan. McChrystal’s recommendations also include: (1) increasing the strength of the Afghan National Police (ANP) from 84,000 to 160,000 as soon as practicable to “thicken and harden” security in the districts, provinces, regions and accelerate plans to double the ANP size to operate effectively as a counterinsurgency force. (2) Realign and streamline the responsibilities for the ANSF and (3) develop Afghan ministerial and institutional capabilities, and resources for the forces in the field.
Reporting negligible Al-Qaeda activity in Afghanistan, McChrystal’s counterinsurgency (COIN) operations aims to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people, and deny Taliban the space and opportunity for their war against US and coalition troops. “The key geographical objectives of the major insurgent groups are Kandahar City and Khost province. The (so-called) Quetta Shura Taliban has been working to control Kandahar and its approaches for several years, there are indications that their influence over the city and neighbouring districts is significant and growing. The Haqqani Network aims to eventually regain full control of its traditional base in Khost, Paktia and Paktika, while Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin maintains militant bases in Nangarhar, Nuristan and Kunar. All three insurgent groups require resources – mainly money and manpower. The Quetta Shura Taliban derive funding from the narcotics trade and external donors. The Haqqani Network draws resources principally from Pakistan and Gulf Arab networks, and from its close association with Al-Qaeda and other Pakistan-based insurgent groups. Hizb-e-Islami seeks control of mineral wealth and smuggling routes in the east.”
Choosing Anbar province is “vital ground” in Iraq. The US sent in its best troops, the US Marines. Nine thousand US Marines have been earmarked to be in harm’s way in Helmand province, till recently the prime area of operations of British troops. Talking to US Marines and US Army soldiers at Camp Lejeune, Adm Mike Mullen, the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, predicted more casualties “before things get better.” Mainly confined in Iraq to urban areas, counter-guerrilla operations in Afghanistan envisages classic rural campaign in very tough terrain, ranging from being rugged and mountainous along the Durand Line to vast desert areas west and south-west of Kandahar.
The “military surge” must cater for Taliban fleeing across the border into Pakistan, mainly to areas where the Haqqani Network and Hizb-e-Islami are reportedly got safe havens. The Pakistan Army has made the South Waziristan Agency a “no-go” area for the Taliban. Some Mahsud tribals have sought refuge in Haqqani Network and the Hizb-e-Islami support areas. There are rumours of blunt warnings to Pakistan regarding the Haqqani and Hizb-e-Islami networks. Nobody seems to assess the resultant backlash for Pakistan. In all the wars fought by the US, one doubts that they ever had such an ally “on the cheap” as Pakistan. At $1 million per soldier per year, $30 billion additional is quite a “budget surge” to the annual cost of $70 billion already annually budgeted for maintaining the US presence in Afghanistan. In the face of the US recession, this is also quite some commitment. In contrast to the outlay for Afghanistan. Pakistan gets a pittance of $1.5 billion a year, and that also with a lot of hoopla.
The acid test will be whether the ANA has the capability of (or enthusiasm for) assuming responsibility within 18 months, 36 at the outside. During the 80’s, the ANA studiously avoided combat with the Mujahideen, letting the Soviets do all the fighting. Presently the Afghan Army is sitting on the sidelines while the US and Coalition forces face the brunt of the fighting, and the casualties. What will happen after 2012? Will the bulk of the Afghan Army “surge” to the opposition like they have done twice before?
The “military surge” may well succeed for the time being, whether the usual Afghan “reverse swing” will take place after 2012, only time will tell.
Dec 10, 2009
Escalate and expand
Asif Ezdi
The “Af-Pak” policy announced by Obama on Dec 1 can be summed up in two words: escalate and expand. Firstly, it signals an escalation of the war in Afghanistan and of pressure on Islamabad to take tougher action against terrorist groups allegedly enjoying safe havens in Pakistan. Secondly, it forebodes the expansion of drone attacks and other US covert operations in Pakistan.
That is the bottom line of the new Afghanistan strategy. The rest is mostly either salesmanship to make it palatable to an increasingly skeptical home constituency or a combination of sticks and carrots to win the cooperation of Pakistan. The threat of sticks is immediate, while the carrots – the offer of a long-term bilateral “partnership” and the possibility of a more active role in promoting a resolution of Kashmir – are for the future. US involvement in Kashmir, moreover, would be unhelpful to the cause of azadi, because Washington favours a settlement which legitimises the Indian occupation of Kashmir in return for some cosmetic concessions.
As The New York Times wrote, the policy announced by Obama is “not so much a new strategy as a doubling down on the one he embraced earlier this year.” In January, when Obama became president, there were 34,000 US troops in Afghanistan. Presently, there are 71,000. The additional 30,000 pairs of boots that will be sent now will take troop level to more than 100,000. More than half of them will have been sent there by Obama. The war in Afghanistan has clearly become Obama’s war, just as that in Iraq was Bush’s war.
Obama is also conscious it could become his Vietnam, though in his speech he rejected this notion as a “false reading of history.” But the parallels are undeniable. Even more striking is the resemblance with the “surge” and the failed attempt at “Afghanisation” that preceded the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan two decades ago.
The number of American casualties – about 930 killed – is a fraction of that suffered by the Soviets, but the pressure it generates in a democracy like America is by no means negligible. The financial costs of the war are also rising. According to one estimate, a long-term commitment could cost anywhere from $500 billion to $900 billion over the next decade. The domestic pressure to end the war has been rising as the prospects of victory recede and costs multiply.
The Americans accept now that the Taliban cannot be wiped out. The present goal is not to defeat the Taliban but simply to “degrade” their power and secure major population centres, and to expand and train the Afghan army and police to enable them to take over the fighting themselves.
Obama’s dilemma is that while his domestic constituency expects him to bring the troops home as early as possible, his international credibility requires that they should remain in Afghanistan as long as al Qaeda has not been eliminated from the region and the Taliban remain a threat to the survival of the government in Kabul. US officials have therefore been emphasising that Obama has only given a date for the beginning of the withdrawal, not for its end. Even this timeline would be flexible, the initial withdrawal could be very limited and the pace of further withdrawals would be determined by “conditions on the ground.”
An immediate US pullout is not on the cards, but even its prospect could intensify the competition for influence and strategic gain among the regional players. India, in particular, has invested a lot in Afghanistan because it treats the country as its backyard which is crucial to the policy of encircling Pakistan and gaining strategic access to Central Asia. Although Washington is aware of operations by Indian intelligence agencies in Afghanistan, it has done little to restrain Delhi. In her testimony on Afghanistan before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Dec 2, Hillary Clinton appeared to concede an even bigger regional role to India when she named it among countries that shared the US objective of expanding support to Pakistan.
Since the additional forces being sent to Afghanistan will be deployed largely in the southern Pakhtun belt where the Taliban are strongest, the fear is that fighting there could push these fighters, as well as refugees, into Pakistan, especially Balochistan, and destabilise Pakistan’s border areas. The government has conveyed these apprehensions to the Americans. But it is unlikely that considerations of Pakistan’s stability will restrain the US from conducting operations it considers necessary from the military point of view. Pakistan must therefore continue to urge the US at least to do more to prevent cross-border movements on the border, now that it is building up its forces in the country.
The more direct and far more serious threat facing Pakistan comes from the planned expansion of covert and not-so-covert operations by the US on Pakistani soil, because they would destabilise not just the border areas but the entire country, with far-reaching consequences for the region. Washington has conveyed to Pakistan, in no uncertain terms, that if Pakistan does not act more aggressively against the Quetta Shura and against terrorist groups said to be in the country, the US will. American action would then be in the form of more strikes by drone aircraft, including in Balochistan, and covert ground raids by special operations forces, like that carried out in Jalal Khel in September 2008. As the saying goes, to a man with only a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. Evidently, Pakistan has to do a better job of making the Americans grasp the disastrous consequences of such a military escalation in Pakistan.
For good measure, Obama also raised the nuclear spectre in his speech and alluded to the possibility that Al Qaeda and other extremists could get access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. According to press leaks, Washington has also commissioned new intelligence studies on the vulnerability of Pakistani warheads and laboratories to seizure by extremists.
US warnings to Pakistan have been accompanied by some carrots. In a letter to Zardari last month, Obama offered an expanded strategic partnership, including enhanced military and economic cooperation, trade benefits and support for greater regional cooperation. US officials have reportedly spoken of the “unlimited potential” of this partnership and hinted that Washington would consider any proposal Islamabad puts on the table. Obama has also told a group of journalists that the reduction of tensions between Pakistan and India, though enormously difficult, was “as important as anything to the long-term stability of the region.” This suggests a willingness to play a discreet behind-the-scenes role on Kashmir.
Strategic partnership is a term which has become quite devalued through excessive use and, as with all packages, the important thing is not the label but the contents. In June 2004, Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally, supposedly to signal a special security relationship. Many Pakistanis wondered what it meant. One year later, they received the answer, as Washington told Islamabad quite categorically that the ban on civilian nuclear cooperation that was being lifted for India would continue to apply to Pakistan.
Pakistan should now make it clear that it would take the offer of strategic partnership seriously only if it includes access to civilian nuclear cooperation on the same terms as those given to India. This should have been spelled out in the reply sent by Zardari to Obama’s letter. The issue should now be taken up by the prime minister in a letter to Obama and brought to the forefront of the bilateral agenda with Washington.
But we should stop requesting US involvement in a resolution of Kashmir, because any such intervention at the present time would be for a settlement on the lines of the deal that Musharraf was negotiating with Manmohan Singh and which would have legalised India’s occupation of the state.
The “Af-Pak” policy announced by Obama on Dec 1 can be summed up in two words: escalate and expand. Firstly, it signals an escalation of the war in Afghanistan and of pressure on Islamabad to take tougher action against terrorist groups allegedly enjoying safe havens in Pakistan. Secondly, it forebodes the expansion of drone attacks and other US covert operations in Pakistan.
That is the bottom line of the new Afghanistan strategy. The rest is mostly either salesmanship to make it palatable to an increasingly skeptical home constituency or a combination of sticks and carrots to win the cooperation of Pakistan. The threat of sticks is immediate, while the carrots – the offer of a long-term bilateral “partnership” and the possibility of a more active role in promoting a resolution of Kashmir – are for the future. US involvement in Kashmir, moreover, would be unhelpful to the cause of azadi, because Washington favours a settlement which legitimises the Indian occupation of Kashmir in return for some cosmetic concessions.
As The New York Times wrote, the policy announced by Obama is “not so much a new strategy as a doubling down on the one he embraced earlier this year.” In January, when Obama became president, there were 34,000 US troops in Afghanistan. Presently, there are 71,000. The additional 30,000 pairs of boots that will be sent now will take troop level to more than 100,000. More than half of them will have been sent there by Obama. The war in Afghanistan has clearly become Obama’s war, just as that in Iraq was Bush’s war.
Obama is also conscious it could become his Vietnam, though in his speech he rejected this notion as a “false reading of history.” But the parallels are undeniable. Even more striking is the resemblance with the “surge” and the failed attempt at “Afghanisation” that preceded the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan two decades ago.
The number of American casualties – about 930 killed – is a fraction of that suffered by the Soviets, but the pressure it generates in a democracy like America is by no means negligible. The financial costs of the war are also rising. According to one estimate, a long-term commitment could cost anywhere from $500 billion to $900 billion over the next decade. The domestic pressure to end the war has been rising as the prospects of victory recede and costs multiply.
The Americans accept now that the Taliban cannot be wiped out. The present goal is not to defeat the Taliban but simply to “degrade” their power and secure major population centres, and to expand and train the Afghan army and police to enable them to take over the fighting themselves.
Obama’s dilemma is that while his domestic constituency expects him to bring the troops home as early as possible, his international credibility requires that they should remain in Afghanistan as long as al Qaeda has not been eliminated from the region and the Taliban remain a threat to the survival of the government in Kabul. US officials have therefore been emphasising that Obama has only given a date for the beginning of the withdrawal, not for its end. Even this timeline would be flexible, the initial withdrawal could be very limited and the pace of further withdrawals would be determined by “conditions on the ground.”
An immediate US pullout is not on the cards, but even its prospect could intensify the competition for influence and strategic gain among the regional players. India, in particular, has invested a lot in Afghanistan because it treats the country as its backyard which is crucial to the policy of encircling Pakistan and gaining strategic access to Central Asia. Although Washington is aware of operations by Indian intelligence agencies in Afghanistan, it has done little to restrain Delhi. In her testimony on Afghanistan before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Dec 2, Hillary Clinton appeared to concede an even bigger regional role to India when she named it among countries that shared the US objective of expanding support to Pakistan.
Since the additional forces being sent to Afghanistan will be deployed largely in the southern Pakhtun belt where the Taliban are strongest, the fear is that fighting there could push these fighters, as well as refugees, into Pakistan, especially Balochistan, and destabilise Pakistan’s border areas. The government has conveyed these apprehensions to the Americans. But it is unlikely that considerations of Pakistan’s stability will restrain the US from conducting operations it considers necessary from the military point of view. Pakistan must therefore continue to urge the US at least to do more to prevent cross-border movements on the border, now that it is building up its forces in the country.
The more direct and far more serious threat facing Pakistan comes from the planned expansion of covert and not-so-covert operations by the US on Pakistani soil, because they would destabilise not just the border areas but the entire country, with far-reaching consequences for the region. Washington has conveyed to Pakistan, in no uncertain terms, that if Pakistan does not act more aggressively against the Quetta Shura and against terrorist groups said to be in the country, the US will. American action would then be in the form of more strikes by drone aircraft, including in Balochistan, and covert ground raids by special operations forces, like that carried out in Jalal Khel in September 2008. As the saying goes, to a man with only a hammer, every problem looks like a nail. Evidently, Pakistan has to do a better job of making the Americans grasp the disastrous consequences of such a military escalation in Pakistan.
For good measure, Obama also raised the nuclear spectre in his speech and alluded to the possibility that Al Qaeda and other extremists could get access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. According to press leaks, Washington has also commissioned new intelligence studies on the vulnerability of Pakistani warheads and laboratories to seizure by extremists.
US warnings to Pakistan have been accompanied by some carrots. In a letter to Zardari last month, Obama offered an expanded strategic partnership, including enhanced military and economic cooperation, trade benefits and support for greater regional cooperation. US officials have reportedly spoken of the “unlimited potential” of this partnership and hinted that Washington would consider any proposal Islamabad puts on the table. Obama has also told a group of journalists that the reduction of tensions between Pakistan and India, though enormously difficult, was “as important as anything to the long-term stability of the region.” This suggests a willingness to play a discreet behind-the-scenes role on Kashmir.
Strategic partnership is a term which has become quite devalued through excessive use and, as with all packages, the important thing is not the label but the contents. In June 2004, Bush designated Pakistan as a major non-NATO ally, supposedly to signal a special security relationship. Many Pakistanis wondered what it meant. One year later, they received the answer, as Washington told Islamabad quite categorically that the ban on civilian nuclear cooperation that was being lifted for India would continue to apply to Pakistan.
Pakistan should now make it clear that it would take the offer of strategic partnership seriously only if it includes access to civilian nuclear cooperation on the same terms as those given to India. This should have been spelled out in the reply sent by Zardari to Obama’s letter. The issue should now be taken up by the prime minister in a letter to Obama and brought to the forefront of the bilateral agenda with Washington.
But we should stop requesting US involvement in a resolution of Kashmir, because any such intervention at the present time would be for a settlement on the lines of the deal that Musharraf was negotiating with Manmohan Singh and which would have legalised India’s occupation of the state.
Nov 29, 2009
Why Zardari is angry
By Hamid Mir
ISLAMABAD: The Pakistani media is again under attack from inside and outside. The charges are not new as these were actually framed by former president Pervez Musharraf who imposed the biggest ban on the media in the history of Pakistan on November 3, 2007.
Pervez Musharraf said the Pakistani media was responsible not only for political instability but was also involved in promoting terrorism. He planned to fix a top media tycoon and some TV anchors under sedition charges but failed because the whole media, the civil society and especially the lawyers were united against him.
Nobody can deny the fact actually it was the media and lawyers that put Musharraf under so much pressure that he brokered a deal with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) for his survival in October 2007.
Again it was the media that played an important role in his departure from Islamabad and Asif Ali Zardari availed the opportunity of becoming the president of Pakistan. Now the Zardari regime is repeating everything that the Musharraf regime used to say against the media. They are trying to put the blame of every wrong deed in the country on the media.
The rulers complained that Geo and the Jang Group always played a leading role in highlighting their misdeeds. Later others followed this lead and joined the struggle against corruption and misrule. Geo and the Jang Group, the rulers complained, are the trendsetters and others just follow in their footstep. They, therefore, considered that Geo and the Jang Group were responsible for the situation they found themselves in.
Musharraf used to tell Geo and the Jang Group, “You are the biggest group and number 1 channel.” Zardari has gone a step further by saying that a channel (Geo) has a monopoly.
They want to teach us a lesson for reminding them of their own promises, for exposing corruption and criticising bad governance but this time their strategy is different. They will not attack the whole media in one go like Musharraf. They will attack us one by one by adopting the strategy of divide and rule.
In the first phase, President Zardari targeted Geo TV without naming it publicly while addressing a big PPP gathering in Karachi recently. He never appreciated that it was the same TV channel, which aired interview of Nawaz Sharif a few days ago in which the PML-N leader supported the current democratic system and warned that he will not accept any unconstitutional move against President Zardari.
This interview killed many rumours against Zardari and the fact of the matter is that the interview of Nawaz Sharif on Geo TV was the biggest relief to Zardari in recent times at a time when political allies like the MQM were not happy with him. The Nawaz interview was not only telecast by Geo and also prominently displayed in all publications of the Jang Group including The News and Jang. The text of the interview was also published.
After getting some strength from Nawaz Sharif, the first thing President Zardari did was to attack Geo TV.
Some of the PPP ministers have informed us privately that President Zardari is not happy with the media due to its criticism of the Kerry-Lugar Bill and the NRO. PPP leaders like Raza Rabbani also criticised the KLB and the NRO openly. There was no doubt that PPP lost support from its own legislators over the issues of the KLB and the NRO but instead of putting his own house in order President Zardari threw the blame on the media.
In the last 20 months, the PPP-led coalition government committed at least 20 blunders. The media only pointed out these blunders and not a single blunder was actually created by the media. Here is the list of 20 blunders in the last 20 months:
1- Ignoring of Murree Declaration: The PML-N was part of the PPP-led coalition government in the beginning. Both parties signed a declaration for the restoration of deposed judges on March 9, 2008 in Murree. The PPP ignored the written agreement with the PML-N and finally the PML-N was forced to leave the federal cabinet. That was the first crisis that damaged the credibility of the new government right in the beginning.
2- Mistrust between the security establishment and the civilian government: The PPP presented a resolution in the National Assembly in April 2008, demanding investigation into the assassination of late Benazir Bhutto by the United Nations. This resolution gave an impression that the PPP leaders did not trust the intelligence agencies of their own government. Later, a UN commission for the investigation was also created that tried to contact many officials from the security establishment for the investigation and more tension was created.
3- Putting ISI under the control of Interior Ministry: The PPP government tried to put the ISI under the control of Interior Minister Rehman Malik in July 2008 through a notification. This move created a new controversy and within a few hours this move backfired.
4- Using secret funds to tame media: A sum of Rs480 million was drawn from the secret fund of the Intelligence Bureau in July 2008. Immediately after taking over, the new IB boss Dr Shoaib Suddle initiated an inquiry about the use of Rs480 million. A big chunk of that money was used to tame the media but it never worked and many independent journalists started asking questions from the government ministers about this money but they had no answer. The prime minister told one of his ministers that he was not aware how this money was drawn from the IB without his knowledge. A junior government official when contacted said, on the condition of not being named, that there was a talk about Rs480 million drawn from the secret fund but he did not know whether the money was distributed or not.
5- Differences between the prime minister and the president: Many PPP ministers shared inside stories of differences between the premier and the president with their friends in the media, but there was no confirmation. All these stories were confirmed when Prime Minister Gilani sacked his National Security Adviser Mahmood Ali Durrani who was actually a nominee of President Zardari. These differences surfaced once again over the appointment of a DMG officer as an ambassador in France. The prime minister refused to oblige the president. The media only reported the tussle between the two big wigs of the country.
6- Disqualification of the Sharif brothers: President Zardari used PCO judges to disqualify Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif. This move created a lot of tension between the two big parties of the country and it also affected the stock market.
7- Imposition of the governor’s rule in Punjab: President Zardari imposed the governor’s rule in February 2009 in the biggest province of Pakistan. He tried to win the loyalties of PML-N MPAs in the provincial assembly for putting his own chief minister in Lahore. Some people in the media supported the governor’s rule in Punjab. Most of these people had also supported Musharraf in the past and their support to the new regime only discredited Zardari.
8- Forcing lawyers to start the Long March: President Zardari ignored the restoration of the deposed judges for the whole one year and finally lawyers were forced to start a long march from Lahore to Islamabad. Nawaz Sharif was put under house arrest but he defied the government orders. He came out on the roads and within a few hours broke the myth of the Zardari regime. The Army chief also intervened and finally the prime minister announced the restoration of all the deposed judges. The media was not responsible for the humiliation of President Zardari because the whole crisis was created out of his own governor’s rule.
9- Rental Power Plant projects: It was not the media but PPP Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf who announced that there will be no loadshedding in the country by December 31, 2009 with the help of rental power plants. These plants came under criticism in the federal cabinet and lots of wrongdoings were reported in these projects. Later, Prime Minister Gilani asked Raja Pervez Ashraf not to make any promises which could not be fulfilled.
10- Sugar crisis: The government completely failed to apprehend a big sugar crisis in the country despite repeated early warnings from many experts. State Minister for Production Ayatullah Durrani disclosed in the Parliament the names of owners of sugar mills who were responsible for the crisis but Federal Minister for Production Manzoor Wattoo contradicted his deputy. This crisis exposed the bad governance of the government. The media only reported the sufferings of the common Pakistanis created out of this ‘made by Zardari’ crisis.
11- Role of US private security agencies: It was actually Pervez Musharraf who allowed US security agencies to operate freely in Pakistan but the Zardari regime allowed them to buy land in many Pakistani cities and also allowed them to rent houses in Islamabad and Peshawar. Armed Americans clashed with Pakistani citizens many times in Peshawar and Islamabad but police never took any action against them. This damaged the credibility of the Zardari regime.
12- Ignoring trial of Musharraf under Article 6: The Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the emergency imposed on November 3, 2007 unconstitutional. Opposition parties demanded the trial of Musharraf under Article 6 of the constitution but President Zardari told some media persons that he cannot try Musharraf due to an understanding with some foreign countries. This disclosure further exposed the level of foreign interference in Pakistan.
13- Differences with the army on the KLB: Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued a press release in October 2009 and expressed the concerns of army high command on the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Differences between the army and civilian government came under discussion in the media. People around Zardari termed these discussions anti-democracy and conspiracies of ‘right wing anchors’.
14- Non-implementation of parliament resolution on drone attacks: US drone attacks in Pakistani tribal areas were started during the Musharraf regime but these attacks were doubled in last 20 months despite a unanimous resolution adopted by the new parliament against these attacks. A non-transparent policy on war against terror also damaged the Zardari regime.
15- Weak foreign policy: The Zardari regime claimed that the Friends of Democratic Pakistan forum will help us in these difficult times but there was no substantial help from this newly formed group. Zardari claimed more than once that India is no more a threat to Pakistan but Prime Minister Gilani declared India a threat for Pakistan many times. There was no unanimity on foreign policy among many government institutions.
16- Denying reports of the Transparency International: According to the recent report of Transparency International, corruption has increased in Pakistan. Prime Minister Gilani ordered Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin to start an inquiry about the reported corruption in the light of TI revelations but Interior Minister Rehman Malik termed this report baseless. This dichotomy again raised a question that who holds the control of Islamabad?
17- Non-implementation of the Charter of Democracy: The PPP promised to implement the CoD signed between the late Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in its 2008 election manifesto. The Zardari regime failed to implement the CoD in last 20 months.
18- Rigging in Gilgit-Baltistan elections: The PPP and the MQM actually developed differences over reported rigging in the election for Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly. The PPP failed to satisfy its ally that is part of the government not only in Sindh but also in Islamabad.
19- NRO fiasco: The PPP leadership tried to make the NRO an act of parliament but its strategy failed due to the non-cooperation of the PML-N and the MQM. When the media started discussions about the beneficiaries of the NRO, the law minister came out with a list of 8,041 beneficiaries with names of President Zardari, Defence Minister Ahmad Mukhtar and Interior Minister Rehman Malik and many others. The defence minister and many others rejected the report and destroyed the credibility of their own government.
According to the decision of the Supreme Court on July 31, the NRO will lapse on November 28 and this lapse has created insecurity among the PPP circles.
20- PPP’s November 25 rally: The PPP leadership arranged a rally in Karachi on November 25 that created many new controversies. Sindh Home Minister Zulfiqar Mirza claimed that the establishment was involved in conspiracies. He also mentioned ‘Sindh card’, while President Zardari attacked Geo TV and gave a clear impression that he is still under pressure. Most of the analysts said that Zardari was not speaking like a strong leader and his close friend Zulfiqar Mirza intentionally challenged establishment because he thought that Nawaz Sharif was on PPP’s side this time.
ISLAMABAD: The Pakistani media is again under attack from inside and outside. The charges are not new as these were actually framed by former president Pervez Musharraf who imposed the biggest ban on the media in the history of Pakistan on November 3, 2007.
Pervez Musharraf said the Pakistani media was responsible not only for political instability but was also involved in promoting terrorism. He planned to fix a top media tycoon and some TV anchors under sedition charges but failed because the whole media, the civil society and especially the lawyers were united against him.
Nobody can deny the fact actually it was the media and lawyers that put Musharraf under so much pressure that he brokered a deal with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) under the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) for his survival in October 2007.
Again it was the media that played an important role in his departure from Islamabad and Asif Ali Zardari availed the opportunity of becoming the president of Pakistan. Now the Zardari regime is repeating everything that the Musharraf regime used to say against the media. They are trying to put the blame of every wrong deed in the country on the media.
The rulers complained that Geo and the Jang Group always played a leading role in highlighting their misdeeds. Later others followed this lead and joined the struggle against corruption and misrule. Geo and the Jang Group, the rulers complained, are the trendsetters and others just follow in their footstep. They, therefore, considered that Geo and the Jang Group were responsible for the situation they found themselves in.
Musharraf used to tell Geo and the Jang Group, “You are the biggest group and number 1 channel.” Zardari has gone a step further by saying that a channel (Geo) has a monopoly.
They want to teach us a lesson for reminding them of their own promises, for exposing corruption and criticising bad governance but this time their strategy is different. They will not attack the whole media in one go like Musharraf. They will attack us one by one by adopting the strategy of divide and rule.
In the first phase, President Zardari targeted Geo TV without naming it publicly while addressing a big PPP gathering in Karachi recently. He never appreciated that it was the same TV channel, which aired interview of Nawaz Sharif a few days ago in which the PML-N leader supported the current democratic system and warned that he will not accept any unconstitutional move against President Zardari.
This interview killed many rumours against Zardari and the fact of the matter is that the interview of Nawaz Sharif on Geo TV was the biggest relief to Zardari in recent times at a time when political allies like the MQM were not happy with him. The Nawaz interview was not only telecast by Geo and also prominently displayed in all publications of the Jang Group including The News and Jang. The text of the interview was also published.
After getting some strength from Nawaz Sharif, the first thing President Zardari did was to attack Geo TV.
Some of the PPP ministers have informed us privately that President Zardari is not happy with the media due to its criticism of the Kerry-Lugar Bill and the NRO. PPP leaders like Raza Rabbani also criticised the KLB and the NRO openly. There was no doubt that PPP lost support from its own legislators over the issues of the KLB and the NRO but instead of putting his own house in order President Zardari threw the blame on the media.
In the last 20 months, the PPP-led coalition government committed at least 20 blunders. The media only pointed out these blunders and not a single blunder was actually created by the media. Here is the list of 20 blunders in the last 20 months:
1- Ignoring of Murree Declaration: The PML-N was part of the PPP-led coalition government in the beginning. Both parties signed a declaration for the restoration of deposed judges on March 9, 2008 in Murree. The PPP ignored the written agreement with the PML-N and finally the PML-N was forced to leave the federal cabinet. That was the first crisis that damaged the credibility of the new government right in the beginning.
2- Mistrust between the security establishment and the civilian government: The PPP presented a resolution in the National Assembly in April 2008, demanding investigation into the assassination of late Benazir Bhutto by the United Nations. This resolution gave an impression that the PPP leaders did not trust the intelligence agencies of their own government. Later, a UN commission for the investigation was also created that tried to contact many officials from the security establishment for the investigation and more tension was created.
3- Putting ISI under the control of Interior Ministry: The PPP government tried to put the ISI under the control of Interior Minister Rehman Malik in July 2008 through a notification. This move created a new controversy and within a few hours this move backfired.
4- Using secret funds to tame media: A sum of Rs480 million was drawn from the secret fund of the Intelligence Bureau in July 2008. Immediately after taking over, the new IB boss Dr Shoaib Suddle initiated an inquiry about the use of Rs480 million. A big chunk of that money was used to tame the media but it never worked and many independent journalists started asking questions from the government ministers about this money but they had no answer. The prime minister told one of his ministers that he was not aware how this money was drawn from the IB without his knowledge. A junior government official when contacted said, on the condition of not being named, that there was a talk about Rs480 million drawn from the secret fund but he did not know whether the money was distributed or not.
5- Differences between the prime minister and the president: Many PPP ministers shared inside stories of differences between the premier and the president with their friends in the media, but there was no confirmation. All these stories were confirmed when Prime Minister Gilani sacked his National Security Adviser Mahmood Ali Durrani who was actually a nominee of President Zardari. These differences surfaced once again over the appointment of a DMG officer as an ambassador in France. The prime minister refused to oblige the president. The media only reported the tussle between the two big wigs of the country.
6- Disqualification of the Sharif brothers: President Zardari used PCO judges to disqualify Nawaz Sharif and Shahbaz Sharif. This move created a lot of tension between the two big parties of the country and it also affected the stock market.
7- Imposition of the governor’s rule in Punjab: President Zardari imposed the governor’s rule in February 2009 in the biggest province of Pakistan. He tried to win the loyalties of PML-N MPAs in the provincial assembly for putting his own chief minister in Lahore. Some people in the media supported the governor’s rule in Punjab. Most of these people had also supported Musharraf in the past and their support to the new regime only discredited Zardari.
8- Forcing lawyers to start the Long March: President Zardari ignored the restoration of the deposed judges for the whole one year and finally lawyers were forced to start a long march from Lahore to Islamabad. Nawaz Sharif was put under house arrest but he defied the government orders. He came out on the roads and within a few hours broke the myth of the Zardari regime. The Army chief also intervened and finally the prime minister announced the restoration of all the deposed judges. The media was not responsible for the humiliation of President Zardari because the whole crisis was created out of his own governor’s rule.
9- Rental Power Plant projects: It was not the media but PPP Minister Raja Pervaiz Ashraf who announced that there will be no loadshedding in the country by December 31, 2009 with the help of rental power plants. These plants came under criticism in the federal cabinet and lots of wrongdoings were reported in these projects. Later, Prime Minister Gilani asked Raja Pervez Ashraf not to make any promises which could not be fulfilled.
10- Sugar crisis: The government completely failed to apprehend a big sugar crisis in the country despite repeated early warnings from many experts. State Minister for Production Ayatullah Durrani disclosed in the Parliament the names of owners of sugar mills who were responsible for the crisis but Federal Minister for Production Manzoor Wattoo contradicted his deputy. This crisis exposed the bad governance of the government. The media only reported the sufferings of the common Pakistanis created out of this ‘made by Zardari’ crisis.
11- Role of US private security agencies: It was actually Pervez Musharraf who allowed US security agencies to operate freely in Pakistan but the Zardari regime allowed them to buy land in many Pakistani cities and also allowed them to rent houses in Islamabad and Peshawar. Armed Americans clashed with Pakistani citizens many times in Peshawar and Islamabad but police never took any action against them. This damaged the credibility of the Zardari regime.
12- Ignoring trial of Musharraf under Article 6: The Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the emergency imposed on November 3, 2007 unconstitutional. Opposition parties demanded the trial of Musharraf under Article 6 of the constitution but President Zardari told some media persons that he cannot try Musharraf due to an understanding with some foreign countries. This disclosure further exposed the level of foreign interference in Pakistan.
13- Differences with the army on the KLB: Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued a press release in October 2009 and expressed the concerns of army high command on the Kerry-Lugar Bill. Differences between the army and civilian government came under discussion in the media. People around Zardari termed these discussions anti-democracy and conspiracies of ‘right wing anchors’.
14- Non-implementation of parliament resolution on drone attacks: US drone attacks in Pakistani tribal areas were started during the Musharraf regime but these attacks were doubled in last 20 months despite a unanimous resolution adopted by the new parliament against these attacks. A non-transparent policy on war against terror also damaged the Zardari regime.
15- Weak foreign policy: The Zardari regime claimed that the Friends of Democratic Pakistan forum will help us in these difficult times but there was no substantial help from this newly formed group. Zardari claimed more than once that India is no more a threat to Pakistan but Prime Minister Gilani declared India a threat for Pakistan many times. There was no unanimity on foreign policy among many government institutions.
16- Denying reports of the Transparency International: According to the recent report of Transparency International, corruption has increased in Pakistan. Prime Minister Gilani ordered Finance Minister Shaukat Tarin to start an inquiry about the reported corruption in the light of TI revelations but Interior Minister Rehman Malik termed this report baseless. This dichotomy again raised a question that who holds the control of Islamabad?
17- Non-implementation of the Charter of Democracy: The PPP promised to implement the CoD signed between the late Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in its 2008 election manifesto. The Zardari regime failed to implement the CoD in last 20 months.
18- Rigging in Gilgit-Baltistan elections: The PPP and the MQM actually developed differences over reported rigging in the election for Gilgit-Baltistan Assembly. The PPP failed to satisfy its ally that is part of the government not only in Sindh but also in Islamabad.
19- NRO fiasco: The PPP leadership tried to make the NRO an act of parliament but its strategy failed due to the non-cooperation of the PML-N and the MQM. When the media started discussions about the beneficiaries of the NRO, the law minister came out with a list of 8,041 beneficiaries with names of President Zardari, Defence Minister Ahmad Mukhtar and Interior Minister Rehman Malik and many others. The defence minister and many others rejected the report and destroyed the credibility of their own government.
According to the decision of the Supreme Court on July 31, the NRO will lapse on November 28 and this lapse has created insecurity among the PPP circles.
20- PPP’s November 25 rally: The PPP leadership arranged a rally in Karachi on November 25 that created many new controversies. Sindh Home Minister Zulfiqar Mirza claimed that the establishment was involved in conspiracies. He also mentioned ‘Sindh card’, while President Zardari attacked Geo TV and gave a clear impression that he is still under pressure. Most of the analysts said that Zardari was not speaking like a strong leader and his close friend Zulfiqar Mirza intentionally challenged establishment because he thought that Nawaz Sharif was on PPP’s side this time.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)